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,"THE PRINCE\n"
,""
,"Dedicatory Letter\n\nNiccol\u00f2 Machiavelli to the Magnificent Lorenzo de\u2019\nMedici:\n\nIt is customary most of the time for those who desire to\nacquire favor with a Prince to come to meet him with\nthings that they care most for among their own or with\nthings that they see please him most. Thus, one sees them\nmany times being presented with horses, arms, cloth of\ngold, precious stones and similar ornaments worthy of\ntheir greatness. Thus, since I desire to offer myself to your\nMagnificence with some testimony of my homage to\nyou, I have found nothing in my belongings that I care so\nmuch for and esteem so greatly as the knowledge of the\nactions of great men, learned by me from long experience\nwith modern things and a continuous reading of ancient\nones. Having thought out and examined these things with\ngreat diligence for a long time, and now reduced them to\none small volume, I send it to your Magnificence.\n\nAnd although I judge this work undeserving of your\npresence, yet I have much confidence that through your\nhumanity it may be accepted, considering that no greater\ngift could be made by me than to give you the capacity to be\nable to understand in a very short time all that I have learned\n"
,"and understood in so many years and with so many hard-\nships and dangers for myself. I have not ornamented this\nwork, nor filled it with fulsome phrases nor with pompous\nand magnificent words, nor with any blandishment or su-\nperfluous ornament whatever, with which it is customary\nfor many to describe and adorn their things. For I wanted it\neither not to be honored for anything or to please solely for\nthe variety of the matter and the gravity of the subject. Nor\ndo I want it to be reputed presumption if a man from a\nlow and mean state dares to discuss and give rules for the\ngovernments of princes. For just as those who sketch land-\nscapes place themselves down in the plain to consider the\nnature of mountains and high places and to consider the\nnature of low places place themselves high atop mountains,\nsimilarly, to know well the nature of peoples one needs to be\nprince, and to know well the nature of princes one needs to\nbe of the people.\n\nTherefore, your Magnificence, take this small gift in\nthe spirit with which I send it. If your Magnificence con-\nsiders and reads it diligently, you will learn from it my\nextreme desire that you arrive at the greatness that fortune\nand your other qualities promise you. And if your Magnifi-\ncence will at some time turn your eyes from the summit of\nyour height to these low places, you will learn how un-\ndeservedly I endure a great and continuous malignity of\nfortune.\n"
,"OF PRINCIPALITIES\n\n\nI\n\nHow Many Are the Kinds of\nPrincipalities and in What Modes\nThey Are Acquired\n\nAll states, all dominions that have held and do hold empire\nover men have been and are either republics or principali-\nties. The principalities are either hereditary, in which the\nbloodline of their lord has been their prince for a long time,\nor they are new. The new ones are either altogether new, as\nwas Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are like members\nadded to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires\nthem, as is the kingdom of Naples to the king of Spain.\n"
,"Dominions so acquired are either accustomed to living un-\nder a prince or used to being free; and they are acquired\neither with the arms of others or with one\u2019s own, either by\nfortune or by virtue.\n\n\nII\n\nOf Hereditary Principalities\n\nI shall leave out reasoning on republics because I have rea-\nsoned on them at length another time. I shall address myself\nonly to the principality, and shall proceed by weaving to-\ngether the threads mentioned above; and I shall debate how\nthese principalities may be governed and maintained.\n\nI say, then, that in hereditary states accustomed to the\nbloodline of their prince the difficulties in maintaining\nthem are much less than in new states because it is enough\nonly not to depart from the order of his ancestors, and\nthen to temporize in the face of accidents. In this way, if\nsuch a prince is of ordinary industry, he will always main-\n"
,"tain himself in his state unless there is an extraordinary and\nexcessive force which deprives him of it; and should he be\ndeprived of it, if any mishap whatever befalls the occupier,\nhe reacquires it.\n\nWe have in Italy, for example, the duke of Ferrara,\nwho, for no other cause than that his line was ancient in that\ndominion, did not succumb to the attacks of the Venetians\nin \u201984, nor to those of Pope Julius in \u201910. For the natural\nprince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it is\nfitting that he be more loved. And if extraordinary vices do\nnot make him hated, it is reasonable that he will naturally\nhave the good will of his own. In the antiquity and continu-\nity of the dominion the memories and causes of innovations\nare eliminated; for one change always leaves a dentation for\nthe building of another.\n\n\nIII\n\nOf Mixed Principalities\n\nBut the difficulties reside in the new principality. First, if it\nis not altogether new but like an added member (so that\ntaken as a whole it can be called almost mixed), its in-\nstability arises in the first place from a natural difficulty that\n"
,"exists in all new principalities. This is that men willingly\nchange their lords in the belief that they will fare better: this\nbelief makes them take up arms against him, in which they\nare deceived because they see later by experience that they\nhave done worse. That follows from another natural and\nordinary necessity which requires that one must always\noffend those over whom he becomes a new prince, both\nwith men-at-arms and with infinite other injuries that the\nnew acquisition brings in its wake. So you have as enemies\nall those whom you have offended in seizing that principal-\nity, and you cannot keep as friends those who have put you\nthere because you cannot satisfy them in the mode they had\npresumed and because you cannot use strong medicines\nagainst them, since you are obligated to them. For even\nthough one may have the strongest of armies, he always\nneeds the support of the inhabitants of a province in or-\nder to enter it. Through these causes Louis XII of France\nquickly occupied Milan, and quickly lost it; and Ludovico\u2019s\nown forces were enough to take it from him the first time.\nFor those people which had opened the gates to him, find-\ning themselves deceived in their opinion and in that future\ngood they had presumed for themselves, were unable to\ntolerate the vexations of the new prince.\n\nIt is indeed true that when countries that have rebelled\nare later acquired for the second time, they are lost with\nmore difficulty, because the lord, seizing the opportunity\noffered by the rebellion, is less hesitant to secure himself by\n"
,"punishing offenders, exposing suspects, and providing for\nhimself in the weakest spots. So it was that, if one Duke\nLudovico stirring up a commotion at the borders was\nenough to make France lose Milan the first time, to make\nhim then lose it the second time, the whole world had to be\nagainst him, and his armies eliminated or chased from Italy:\nthis arises from the causes given above. Nonetheless, both\nthe first and the second times it was taken from him.\n\nThe universal causes of the first have been discussed; it\nremains now to say what were the causes of the second, and\nto see what remedies there were to him, which someone\nin his situation could use so as to maintain himself better in\nhis acquisition than France did. Now I say, that such states\nwhich, when acquired, are added to an ancient state of him\nwho acquires them, are either of the same province and\nsame language, or not. When they are, they may be held\nwith great ease, especially if they are not used to living free;\nand to possess them securely it is enough to have eliminated\nthe line of the prince whose dominions they were. For\nwhen their old conditions are maintained for them in other\nthings and there is no disparity of customs, men live qui-\netly \u2014as it may be seen that Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony,\nand Normandy, which have been with France for so long a\ntime, have done; and although there may be some disparity\nof language, nonetheless the customs are similar, and they\ncan easily bear with one another. And whoever acquires\nthem, if he wants to hold them, must have two concerns:\none, that the bloodline of their ancient prince be eliminated;\nthe other, not to alter either their laws or their taxes: so that\nin a very short time it becomes one whole body with their\nancient principality.\n\nBut when one acquires states in a province disparate in\nlanguage, customs, and orders, here are the difficulties, and\nhere one needs to have great fortune and great industry to\n"
,"hold them; and one of the greatest and quickest remedies\nwould be for whoever acquires it to go there to live in\nperson. This would make that possession more secure and\nmore lasting, as the Turk has done in Greece. Despite all the\nother orders observed by him so as to hold that state, if he\nhad not gone there to live, it would not have been possible\nfor him to hold it. For if you stay there, disorders may be\nseen as they arise, and you can soon remedy them; if you\nare not there, disorders become understood when they are\ngreat and there is no longer a remedy. Besides this, the\nprovince is not despoiled by your officials; the subjects are\nsatisfied with ready access to the prince, so that they have\nmore cause to love him if they want to be good and, if they\nwant to be otherwise, more cause to fear him. Whatever\noutsider might want to attack that state has more hesitation\nin doing so; hence, when one lives in it, one can lose it with\nthe greatest difficulty.\n\nThe other, better remedy is to send colonies that are, as\nit were, fetters of that state, to one or two places, because it\nis necessary either to do this or to hold them with many\nmen-at-arms and infantry. One does not spend much on\ncolonies, and without expense of one\u2019s own, or with little,\none may send them and hold them; and one offends only\nthose from whom one takes fields and houses in order to\ngive them to new inhabitants \u2014who are a very small part of\nthat state. And those whom he offends, since they remain\ndispersed and poor, can never harm him, while all the others\nremain on the one hand unhurt, and for this they should be\nquiet; on the other, they are afraid to err from fear that\nwhat happened to the despoiled might happen to them. I\nconclude that such colonies are not costly, are more faithful,\nand less offensive; and those who are offended can do no\nharm, since they are poor and dispersed as was said. For this\nhas to be noted: that men should either be caressed or elimi-\nnated, because they avenge themselves for slight offenses\nbut cannot do so for grave ones; so the offense one does to a\n"
,"man should be such that one does not fear revenge for it.\nBut when one holds a state with men-at-arms in place of\ncolonies, one spends much more since one has to consume\nall the income of that state in guarding it. So the acquisition\nturns to loss, and one offends much more because one harms\nthe whole state as one\u2019s army moves around for lodgings.\nEveryone feels this hardship, and each becomes one\u2019s en-\nemy: and these are enemies that can harm one since they\nremain, though defeated, in their homes. From every side,\ntherefore, keeping guard in this way is as useless as keeping\nguard by means of colonies is useful.\n\nWhoever is in a province that is disparate, as was said,\nshould also make himself head and defender of the neigh-\nboring lesser powers, and contrive to weaken the powerful\nin that province and to take care that through some accident\na foreigner as powerful as he does not enter there. And it will\nalways turn out that a foreigner will be brought in by those\nin the province who are malcontent either because of too\nmuch ambition or out of fear, as once the Aetolians were\nseen to bring the Romans into Greece; and in every other\nprovince they entered, they were brought in by its inhabi-\ntants. And the order of things is such that as soon as a\npowerful foreigner enters a province, all those in it who are\nless powerful adhere to him, moved by the envy they have\nagainst whoever has held power over them. So with respect\nto these lesser powers, he has no trouble in gaining them,\nbecause all together they quickly and willingly make one\nmass with the state that he has acquired there. He has only to\nworry that these lesser powers may get too much force and\ntoo much authority; and with his forces and their support he\ncan easily put down those who are powerful, so as to remain\narbiter of that province in everything. And whoever does\nnot conduct this policy well will soon lose what he has\nacquired, and while he holds it, will have infinite difficulties\nand vexations within it.\n\nThe Romans observed these policies well in the\n"
,"provinces they took. They sent out colonies, indulged the\nlesser powers without increasing their power, put down\nthe powerful, and did not allow foreign powers to gain\nreputation there. And I want the province of Greece alone\nto suffice as an example. The Achaeans and the Aetolians\nwere indulged by the Romans; the kingdom of the Mace-\ndonians was brought down and Antiochus was chased out.\nNor did the merits of the Achaeans or those of the Aetolians\nmake the Romans permit them to increase any state of\ntheirs; nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce them to\nbe his friends without putting him down; nor could the\npower of Antiochus make them consent to his holding any\nstate in that province. For the Romans did in these cases\nwhat all wise princes should do: they not only have to have\nregard for present troubles but also for future ones, and\nthey have to avoid these with all their industry because,\nwhen one foresees from afar, one can easily find a remedy\nfor them but when you wait until they come close to you,\nthe medicine is not in time because the disease has become\nincurable. And it happens with this as the physicians say of\nconsumption, that in the beginning of the illness it is easy to\ncure and difficult to recognize, but in the progress of time,\nwhen it has not been recognized and treated in the begin-\nning, it becomes easy to recognize and difficult to cure. So it\nhappens in affairs of state, because when one recognizes\nfrom afar the evils that arise in a state (which is not given but\nto one who is prudent), they are soon healed; but when they\nare left to grow because they were not recognized, to the\npoint that everyone recognizes them, there is no longer any\nremedy for them.\n\nThus, the Romans, seeing inconveniences from afar,\nalways found remedies for them and never allowed them to\ncontinue so as to escape a war, because they knew that war\nmay not be avoided but is deferred to the advantage of\n"
,"others. So they decided to make war with Philip and Anti-\nochus in Greece in order not to have to do so in Italy; and\nthey could have avoided both one and the other for a time,\nbut they did not want to. Nor did that saying ever please\nthem which is every day in the mouths of the wise men of\nour times\u2014to enjoy the benefit of time \u2014but rather, they\nenjoyed the benefit of their virtue and prudence. For time\nsweeps everything before it and can bring with it good as\nwell as evil and evil as well as good.\n\nBut let us return to France and examine whether he\nhas done any of the things spoken of. I will speak of Louis\nand not of Charles, as the steps of the former, because he\nheld his possession in Italy longer, may be seen better. And\nyou will see that he did the contrary of the things that\nshould be done to hold a state in a disparate province.\n\nKing Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of\nthe Venetians, who wanted to gain half the state of Lom-\nbardy for themselves by his coming. I do not want to blame\nthe course adopted by the king; for since he wanted to begin\nby gaining a foothold in Italy, and having no friends in this\nprovince, indeed, having all doors closed to him because of\nthe conduct of King Charles, he was forced to take what-\never friendships he could get. And having firmly adopted\nthis course he would have succeeded if in managing other\nthings he had not made some error. Thus, when he had\nacquired Lombardy, the king regained quickly the reputa-\ntion that Charles had taken from him: Genoa yielded, and\nthe Florentines became his friends; the marquis of Mantua,\nduke of Ferrara, Bentivoglio, Madonna of Forl\u00ec, the lords of\nFaenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino,\nthe Luccans, Pisans, and Sienese\u2014everyone came to meet\nhim so as to become his friend. And then the Venetians\n"
,"could consider the temerity of the course they had adopted:\nto acquire two lands in Lombardy they made the king lord\nof two-thirds of Italy.\n\nOne may now consider with how little difficulty the\nking could have maintained his reputation in Italy if he had\nobserved the rules written above and had held secure and\ndefended all those friends of his, who, because they were a\ngreat number, weak, and fearful \u2014some of the Church,\nsome of the Venetians\u2014 were always under a necessity to\nstay with him; and by their means he could always have\nsecured himself easily against whoever remained great\namong us. But no sooner was he in Milan than he did the\ncontrary by giving aid to Pope Alexander so that the pope\nmight seize the Romagna. Nor did he notice that with this\ndecision he was weakening himself, stripping himself of his\nfriends and those who had jumped into his lap, while mak-\ning the Church great by adding so much temporal greatness\nto the spiritual one that gives it so much authority. And\nhaving made the first error, he was compelled to continue,\nso that to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to\nprevent his becoming lord of Tuscany, he was compelled to\ncome into Italy. It was not enough for him to have made the\nChurch great and to have stripped himself of his friends, but\nbecause he wanted the kingdom of Naples, he divided it\nwith the king of Spain. Whereas at first he was the arbiter\nof Italy, he brought in a companion so that the ambitious\nones in that province and those malcontent with him had\nsomewhere to turn; and whereas he could have left in that\nkingdom a king who was his pensioner, he threw him out\nso as to bring in one who could expel him.\n\nAnd truly it is a very natural and ordinary thing to\ndesire to acquire, and always, when men do it who can,\nthey will be praised or not blamed; but when they cannot,\n"
,"and wish to do it anyway, here lie the error and the blame.\nThus, if France could have attacked Naples with his own\nforces, he should have done so; if he could not, he should\nnot have divided Naples. And if the division of Lombardy\nhe made with the Venetians deserves excuse because with it\nFrance gained a foothold in Italy, this other one deserves\nblame because it was not excused by that necessity.\n\nSo then Louis had made these five errors: he had elimi-\nnated the lesser powers; increased the power of a power in\nItaly; brought in a very powerful foreigner; did not come to\nlive there; did not put colonies there. Yet if he had lived,\nthese errors could not have hurt him if he had not made a\nsixth: depriving the Venetians of their state. For if he had\nnot made the Church great or brought Spain into Italy,\nit would indeed have been reasonable and necessary to\nput down the Venetians. But when he had adopted these\ncourses first, he should never have consented to their ruin,\nfor while they were powerful they would always have kept\nothers away from a campaign in Lombardy, whether it was\nbecause the Venetians would not have consented to them\nunless they themselves were to become its lords, or because\nthe others would not have wanted to take Lombardy from\nFrance in order to give it to the Venetians, and they would\nnot have had the spirit to go and attack both of them. And if\nsomeone should say: King Louis ceded Romagna to Alex-\nander and the Kingdom to Spain to avoid a war, I reply\nwith the reasons given above: that a disorder should never\nbe allowed to continue so as to avoid a war, because that\nis not to avoid it but to defer it to your disadvantage. And\nif some others should cite the faith that the king had\npledged to the pope, to undertake that enterprise for him\nin return for dissolving his marriage and for the hat of\nRouen, I reply with what I will say below on the faith of\n"
,"princes and how it should be observed. Thus, King Louis\nlost Lombardy for not having observed any of the conditions\nobserved by others who have taken provinces and wished\nto hold them. Nor is this any miracle, but very ordinary\nand reasonable. And I spoke of this matter at Nantes with\nRouen when Valentino (for so Cesare Borgia, son of Pope\nAlexander, was called by the people) was occupying Ro-\nmagna. For when the cardinal of Rouen said to me that the\nItalians do not understand war, I replied to him that the\nFrench do not understand the state, because if they under-\nstood they would not have let the Church come to such\ngreatness. And it may be seen from experience that the\ngreatness in Italy of the Church and of Spain has been caused\nby France, and France\u2019s ruin caused by them. From this one\nmay draw a general rule that never or rarely fails: whoever is\nthe cause of someone\u2019s becoming powerful is ruined; for\nthat power has been caused by him either with industry or\nwith force, and both the one and the other of these two are\nsuspect to whoever has become powerful.\n\n\nIV\n\nWhy the Kingdom of Darius\nWhich Alexander Seized Did Not\nRebel from His Successors after\nAlexander\u2019s Death\n\nThe difficulties that are involved in holding a state newly\nacquired having been considered, one might marvel at how\n"
,"it happened that Alexander the Great became lord of Asia in\na few years, and just after he had seized it, died \u2014from\nwhich it appeared reasonable that all that state would re-\nbel\u2014 nonetheless the successors of Alexander maintained it\nand had no other difficulty in holding it than that which\narose among themselves out of their own ambition. I reply\nthat principalities of which memory remains have been gov-\nerned in two diverse modes: either by one prince, and all the\nothers servants who as ministers help govern the kingdom\nby his favor and appointment; or by a prince and by barons\nwho hold that rank not by favor of the lord but by antiquity\nof bloodline. Such barons have their own states and subjects\nwho recognize them as lords and hold them in natural\naffection. States that are governed by one prince and his\nservants hold their prince in greater authority because in\nall his province there is no one recognized as superior\nbut himself; and if they obey someone else, they do so as a\nminister and official, and do not bear him any particular\nlove.\n\nIn our times the examples of these two diverse kinds of\ngovernment are the Turk and the king of France. The whole\nmonarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord; the others\nare his servants. Dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he\nsends different administrators to them, and he changes and\nvaries them as he likes. But the king of France is placed in\nthe midst of an ancient multitude of lords, acknowledged in\nthat state by their subjects and loved by them: they have\ntheir privileges, and the king cannot take them away with-\nout danger to himself. Thus, whoever considers the one and\nthe other of these states will find difficulty in acquiring the\nstate of the Turk, but should it be conquered, great ease in\nholding it. So inversely, you will find in some respects\n"
,"more ease in seizing the state of France, but great difficulty\nin holding it.\n\nThe causes of the difficulties in being able to seize the\nkingdom of the Turk are that one cannot be called in by\nthe princes in that kingdom, and that one cannot hope to\nfacilitate the enterprise through the rebellion of those\naround him. This arises from the reasons given above, for,\nsince all are slaves and bound by obligation, they can be\ncorrupted with much difficulty, and even if they are cor-\nrupted, one can hope but for little use from it, as they cannot\nbring their peoples with them, for the reasons indicated.\nHence, whoever attacks the Turk must necessarily assume\nthat he will find him entirely united, and he had better put\nhis hope more in his own forces than in the disorders of\nothers. But once the Turk has been overcome and defeated\nin the field in such a way that he cannot rally his armies,\none has only to fear the bloodline of the prince. If this is\neliminated, there remains no one whom one would have to\nfear, since others do not have credit with the people; and just\nas the victor could put no hope in them before his victory,\nso he should not fear them after it.\n\nThe contrary occurs with kingdoms governed like\nFrance, because you can easily enter there, having won over\nto yourself some baron of the kingdom; for malcontents and\nthose who desire to innovate are always to be found. For the\nreasons given, they can open the way for you into that state\nand facilitate victory for you. Then your wish to maintain\nthat victory for yourself brings in its wake infinite difficulties\nboth from those who have helped you and from those you\nhave oppressed. Nor is it enough for you to eliminate the\nbloodline of the prince, because lords remain there who put\nthemselves at the head of new changes; and since you can\nneither content them nor eliminate them, you lose that state\nwhenever their opportunity comes.\n\nNow, if you consider what was the nature of Da-\n"
,"rius\u2019s government, you will find it similar to the kingdom\nof the Turk. Therefore, for Alexander it was necessary first\nto make an all-out attack on him and drive him from the\nfield; after this victory, with Darius dead, that state re-\nmained secure for Alexander for the reasons discussed\nabove. And if his successors had been united, they could\nhave enjoyed it at leisure, nor did any tumults occur in that\nkingdom besides those they themselves incited. But it is\nimpossible to possess states ordered like France with such\nquiet. Hence arose the frequent rebellions in Spain, France,\nand Greece against the Romans, because of the numerous\nprincipalities that existed in those states. As long as their\nmemory lasted, the Romans were always uncertain of their\npossession, but when their memory was eliminated with the\npower and long duration of the empire, the Romans became\nsecure possessors of them. And the Romans possessed them\neven though, when they later fought among themselves,\neach took for himself a part of those provinces in accordance\nwith the authority he had got within it; and the provinces,\nbecause the bloodline of their former lords was eliminated,\nacknowledged no one but the Romans. Having considered\nall these things, therefore, no one will marvel at the ease\nwith which Alexander held the state of Asia and at the\ndifficulties others such as Pyrrhus and many more like him\nhad in keeping their acquisitions. This has come not from\nmuch or little virtue in the victor but from the disparity in\nthe subject.\n"
,"V\n\nHow Cities or Principalities Which\nLived by Their Own Laws\nbefore They Were Occupied\nShould Be Administered\n\nWhen those states that are acquired, as has been said, are\naccustomed to living by their own laws and in liberty, there\nare three modes for those who want to hold them: first, ruin\nthem; second, go there to live personally; third, let them live\nby their laws, taking tribute from them and creating within\nthem an oligarchical state which keeps them friendly to you.\nFor since such a state has been created by that prince, it\nknows it cannot stand without his friendship and power, and\nit has to do everything to maintain him. And a city used to\nliving free may be held more easily by means of its own\ncitizens than in any other mode, if one wants to preserve it.\n\nAs examples there are the Spartans and the Romans.\nThe Spartans held Athens and Thebes by creating oligarchi-\ncal states there; yet they lost them again. The Romans, in\norder to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, destroyed\nthem and did not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece\nmuch as the Spartans had held it, by making it free and\nleaving it its own laws. But they did not succeed; so they\nwere compelled to destroy many cities in that province so as\nto hold it. For in truth there is no secure mode to possess\nthem other than to ruin them. And whoever becomes pa-\n"
,"tron of a city accustomed to living free and does not destroy\nit, should expect to be destroyed by it; for it always has as a\nrefuge in rebellion the name of liberty and its own ancient\norders which are never forgotten either through length of\ntime or because of benefits received. Whatever one does\nor provides for, unless the inhabitants are broken up or\ndispersed, they will not forget that name and those orders,\nand will immediately recur to them upon any accident as did\nPisa after having been kept in servitude a hundred years by\nthe Florentines. But, when cities or provinces are used to\nliving under a prince, and his bloodline is eliminated \u2014since\non the one hand they are used to obeying, and on the other\nthey do not have the old prince\u2014 they will not agree to\nmake one from among themselves and they do not know\nhow to live free. So they are slower to take up arms, and a\nprince can gain them with greater ease and can secure him-\nself against them. But in republics there is greater life,\ngreater hatred, more desire for revenge; the memory of\ntheir ancient liberty does not and cannot let them rest,\nso that the most secure path is to eliminate them or live\nin them.\n\n\nVI\n\nOf New Principalities That Are\nAcquired through One\u2019s Own\nArms and Virtue\n\nNo one should marvel if, in speaking as I will do of prin-\ncipalities that are altogether new both in prince and in state,\n"
,"I bring up the greatest examples. For since men almost\nalways walk on paths beaten by others and proceed in their\nactions by imitation, unable either to stay on the paths of\nothers altogether or to attain the virtue of those whom you\nimitate, a prudent man should always enter upon the paths\nbeaten by great men, and imitate those who have been most\nexcellent, so that if his own virtue does not reach that far, it\nis at least in the odor of it. He should do as prudent archers\ndo when the place they plan to hit appears too distant, and\nknowing how far the strength of their bow carries, they set\ntheir aim much higher than the place intended, not to reach\nsuch height with their arrow, but to be able with the aid of\nso high an aim to achieve their plan.\n\nI say, then, that in altogether new principalities, where\nthere is a new prince, one encounters more or less difficulty\nin maintaining them according to whether the one who\nacquires them is more or less virtuous. And because the\nresult of becoming prince from private individual presup-\nposes either virtue or fortune, it appears that one or the\nother of these two things relieves in part many difficulties;\nnonetheless, he who has relied less on fortune has main-\ntained himself more. To have the prince compelled to come\nto live there in person, because he has no other states, makes\nit still easier. But, to come to those who have become\nprinces by their own virtue and not by fortune, I say that the\nmost excellent are Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and\nthe like. And although one should not reason about Moses,\nas he was a mere executor of things that had been ordered\nfor him by God, nonetheless he should be admired if only\nfor that grace which made him deserving of speaking with\nGod. But let us consider Cyrus and the others who have\nacquired or founded kingdoms: you will find them all ad-\nmirable; and if their particular actions and orders are consid-\n"
,"ered, they will appear no different from those of Moses,\nwho had so great a teacher. And as one examines their\nactions and lives, one does not see that they had anything\nelse from fortune than the opportunity, which gave them\nthe matter enabling them to introduce any form they\npleased. Without that opportunity their virtue of spirit\nwould have been eliminated, and without that virtue the\nopportunity would have come in vain.\n\nIt was necessary then for Moses to find the people of\nIsrael in Egypt, enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, so\nthat they would be disposed to follow him so as to get out of\ntheir servitude. It was fitting that Romulus not be received\nin Alba, that he should have been exposed at birth, if he was\nto become king of Rome and founder of that fatherland.\nCyrus needed to find the Persians malcontent with the\nempire of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate\nbecause of a long peace. Theseus could not have demon-\nstrated his virtue if he had not found the Athenians dis-\npersed. Such opportunities, therefore, made these men\nhappy, and their excellent virtue enabled the opportunity to\nbe recognized; hence their fatherlands were ennobled by it\nand became very happy.\n\nThose like these men, who become princes by the\npaths of virtue, acquire their principality with difficulty but\nhold it with ease; and the difficulties they have in acquiring\ntheir principality arise in part from the new orders and\nmodes that they are forced to introduce so as to found their\nstate and their security. And it should be considered that\nnothing is more difficult to handle, more doubtful of suc-\ncess, nor more dangerous to manage, than to put oneself at\nthe head of introducing new orders. For the introducer has\nall those who benefit from the old orders as enemies, and he\nhas lukewarm defenders in all those who might benefit\nfrom the new orders. This lukewarmness arises partly from\nfear of adversaries who have the laws on their side and\npartly from the incredulity of men, who do not truly be-\n"
,"lieve in new things unless they come to have a firm experi-\nence of them. Consequently, whenever those who are\nenemies have opportunity to attack, they do so with partisan\nzeal, and the others defend lukewarmly so that one is in peril\nalong with them. It is however necessary, if one wants to\ndiscuss this aspect well, to examine whether these innova-\ntors stand by themselves or depend on others; that is,\nwhether to carry out their deed they must beg or indeed\ncan use force. In the first case they always come to ill and\nnever accomplish anything; but when they depend on their\nown and are able to use force, then it is that they are rarely in\nperil. From this it arises that all the armed prophets con-\nquered and the unarmed ones were ruined. For, besides the\nthings that have been said, the nature of peoples is variable;\nand it is easy to persuade them of something, but difficult to\nkeep them in that persuasion. And thus things must be\nordered in such a mode that when they no longer believe,\none can make them believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, The-\nseus, and Romulus would not have been able to make their\npeoples observe their constitutions for long if they had been\nunarmed, as happened in our times to Brother Girolamo\nSavonarola. He was ruined in his new orders as soon as the\nmultitude began not to believe in them, and he had no\nmode for holding firm those who had believed nor for mak-\ning unbelievers believe. Men such as these, therefore, find\ngreat difficulty in conducting their affairs; all their dangers\nare along the path, and they must overcome them with\nvirtue. But once they have overcome them and they begin\nto be held in veneration, having eliminated those who had\n"
,"envied them for their quality, they remain powerful, secure,\nhonored, and happy.\n\nTo such high examples I want to add a lesser example,\nbut it will have some proportion with the others and I\nwant it to suffice for all other similar cases: this is Hiero\nof Syracuse. From private individual he became prince of\nSyracuse, nor did he receive anything more from fortune\nthan the opportunity. For when the Syracusans were op-\npressed, they chose him as their captain, and from there he\nproved worthy of being made their prince. And he was of\nsuch virtue, even in private fortune, that he who wrote of\nhim said \u201cthat he lacked nothing of being a king except a\nkingdom.\u201d Hiero eliminated the old military and organized\na new one; he left his old friendships and made new ones;\nand when he had friendships and soldiers that were his own,\nhe could build any building on top of such a foundation; so\nhe went through a great deal of trouble to acquire, and little\nto maintain.\n\n\nVII\n\nOf New Principalities That Are\nAcquired by Others\u2019 Arms\nand Fortune\n\nThose who become princes from private individual solely\nby fortune become so with little trouble, but maintain\nthemselves with much. They have no difficulty along the\npath because they fly there, but all the difficulties arise when\n"
,"they are in place. And such princes come to be when a state\nis given to someone either for money or by the favor of\nwhoever gives it, as happened to many in Greece, in the\ncities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where they were made\nprinces by Darius so that they might hold on to those cities\nfor his security and glory; as also those emperors were made\nwho from private individual attained the empire through\ncorrupting the soldiers. These persons rest simply on the\nwill and fortune of whoever has given a state to them, which\nare two very inconstant and unstable things. They do not\nknow how to hold and they cannot hold that rank: they do\nnot know how, because if one is not a man of great ingenuity\nand virtue, it is not reasonable, that having always lived in\nprivate fortune, he should know how to command; they\ncannot hold that rank because they do not have forces that\ncan be friendly and faithful to them. Then, too, states that\ncome to be suddenly, like all other things in nature that\nare born and grow quickly, cannot have roots and branches,\nso that the first adverse weather eliminates them \u2014un-\nless, indeed, as was said, those who have suddenly become\nprinces have so much virtue that they know immediately\nhow to prepare to keep what fortune has placed in their laps;\nand the foundations that others have laid before becoming\nprinces they lay afterwards.\n\nTo both of the modes mentioned of becoming prince,\nby virtue or by fortune, I want to bring up two examples\nthat have occurred in days within our memory; and these\nare Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. Francesco became\nduke of Milan from private individual by proper means and\nwith a great virtue of his own; and that which he had\nacquired with a thousand pains he maintained with little\ntrouble. On the other hand Cesare Borgia, called Duke\n"
,"Valentino by the vulgar, acquired his state through the for-\ntune of his father and lost it through the same, notwith-\nstanding the fact that he made use of every deed and did all\nthose things that should be done by a prudent and virtuous\nman to put his roots in the states that the arms and fortune of\nothers had given him. For, as was said above, whoever does\nnot lay his foundations at first might be able, with great\nvirtue, to lay them later, although they might have to be\nlaid with hardship for the architect and with danger to the\nbuilding. Thus, if one considers all the steps of the duke,\none will see that he had laid for himself great foundations\nfor future power, which I do not judge superfluous to dis-\ncuss; for I do not know what better teaching I could give to\na new prince than the example of his actions. And if his\norders did not bring profit to him, it was not his fault,\nbecause this arose from an extraordinary and extreme malig-\nnity of fortune.\n\nAlexander VI had very many difficulties, both present\nand future, when he decided to make his son the duke great.\nFirst, he did not see the path to being able to make him lord\nof any state that was not a state of the Church; and when he\ndecided to take that of the Church, he knew that the duke of\nMilan and the Venetians would not consent to it because\nFaenza and Rimini had for long been under the protection\nof the Venetians. Besides this, he saw that the arms of Italy,\nand especially the arms of anyone whom he might have\nbeen able to make use of, were in the hands of those who\nhad to fear the greatness of the pope; and so he could not\ntrust them, as they were all with the Orsini and the Colonna\nand their accomplices. It was thus necessary to upset those\norders and to bring disorder to their states so as to be able to\nmake himself lord securely of part of them. This was easy\nfor him, because he found that the Venetians, moved by\nother causes, were engaged in getting the French to come\n"
,"back into Italy, which he not only did not oppose but made\neasier by the dissolution of the former marriage of King\nLouis. So the king came into Italy with the aid of the Vene-\ntians and the consent of Alexander, and he was no sooner in\nMilan than the pope got men from him for a campaign in\nRomagna, which was granted to him because of the reputa-\ntion of the king. So after the duke had acquired Romagna\nand beaten down the Colonna, two things prevented him\nfrom maintaining that and going further ahead: one, that his\narms did not appear to him to be faithful; the other, the will\nof France: that is, the Orsini arms of which he had availed\nhimself might fail under him, and not only prevent him\nfrom acquiring but also take away what he had acquired; and\nthe king might also do the same to him. He had a test of\nthe Orsini when, after the capture of Faenza, he attacked\nBologna and saw them go coolly to that attack; and regard-\ning the king, the duke knew his mind when after he had\ntaken the duchy of Urbino, he attacked Tuscany, and the\nking made him desist from that campaign. Hence the duke\ndecided to depend no longer on the arms and fortune of\nothers. And the first thing he did was to weaken the Orsini\nand Colonna parties in Rome. For he gained to himself all\ntheir adherents, who were gentlemen, by making them his\ngentlemen and by giving them large allowances; and he\nhonored them, according to their qualities, with commands\nand with government posts, so that in a few months the\npartisan affections in their minds were eliminated, and all\naffection turned toward the duke. After this he waited for an\nopportunity to eliminate the heads of the Orsini, since he\nhad dispersed those of the Colonna house. A good one came\nto him, and he used it better; for when the Orsini became\naware, late, that the greatness of the duke and of the Church\nwas ruin for them, they held a meeting at Magione, near\nPerugia. From that arose rebellion in Urbino, tumults in\n"
,"Romagna, and infinite dangers for the duke, who overcame\nthem all with the aid of the French. And when his reputa-\ntion had been restored, he trusted neither France nor other\nexternal forces, and so as not to put them to the test, he\nturned to deceit. He knew so well how to dissimulate his\nintent that the Orsini themselves, through Signor Paolo,\nbecame reconciled with him. The duke did not fail to\nfulfill every kind of duty to secure Signor Paolo, giving\nhim money, garments, and horses, so that their simplicity\nbrought them into the duke\u2019s hands at Sinigaglia. So, when\nthese heads had been eliminated, and their partisans had\nbeen turned into his friends, the duke had laid very good\nfoundations for his power, since he had all Romagna with\nthe duchy of Urbino. He thought, especially, that he had\nacquired the friendship of Romagna, and that he had gained\nall those peoples to himself since they had begun to taste\nwell-being.\n\nAnd because this point is deserving of notice and of\nbeing imitated by others, I do not want to leave it out. Once\nthe duke had taken over Romagna, he found it had been\ncommanded by impotent lords who had been readier to\ndespoil their subjects than to correct them, and had given\ntheir subjects matter for disunion, not for union. Since that\nprovince was quite full of robberies, quarrels, and every\nother kind of insolence, he judged it necessary to give it\ngood government, if he wanted to reduce it to peace and\nobedience to a kingly arm. So he put there Messer Remirro\nde Orco, a cruel and ready man, to whom he gave the fullest\npower. In a short time Remirro reduced it to peace and\nunity, with the very greatest reputation for himself. Then\n"
,"the duke judged that such excessive authority was not nec-\nessary, because he feared that it might become hateful; and\nhe set up a civil court in the middle of the province, with a\nmost excellent president, where each city had its advocate.\nAnd because he knew that past rigors had generated some\nhatred for Remirro, to purge the spirits of that people and to\ngain them entirely to himself, he wished to show that if any\ncruelty had been committed, this had not come from him\nbut from the harsh nature of his minister. And having seized\nthis opportunity, he had him placed one morning in the\npiazza at Cesena in two pieces, with a piece of wood and a\nbloody knife beside him. The ferocity of this spectacle left\nthe people at once satisfied and stupefied.\n\nBut let us return to where we left off. I say that when\nthe duke found himself very powerful and secure in part\nagainst present dangers \u2014since he had armed to suit himself\nand had in good part eliminated those arms which were near\nenough to have attacked him\u2014 there remained for him, if\nhe wanted to proceed with acquisition, to consider the king\nof France. For he knew that this would not be tolerated by\nthe king, who had been late to perceive his error. And so he\nbegan to seek out new friendships and to vacillate with\nFrance in the expedition that the French were making to-\nward the kingdom of Naples against the Spanish who were\nbesieging Gaeta. His intent was to secure himself against\nthem: in which he would soon have succeeded, if Alexan-\nder had lived.\n\nAnd these were his arrangements as to present things.\nBut as to the future, he had to fear, first, that a new suc-\ncessor in the Church might not be friendly to him and\nmight seek to take away what Alexander had given him. He\nthought he might secure himself against this in four modes:\nfirst, to eliminate the bloodlines of all those lords he had\n"
,"despoiled, so as to take that opportunity away from the\npope; second, to win over to himself all the gentlemen in\nRome, as was said, so as to be able to hold the pope in check\nwith them; third, to make the College of Cardinals as much\nhis as he could; fourth, to acquire so much empire before\nthe pope died that he could resist a first attack on his own.\nOf these four things he had accomplished three at the death\nof Alexander; the fourth he almost accomplished. For of the\nlords he had despoiled he killed as many as he could reach,\nand very few saved themselves; the Roman gentlemen had\nbeen won over to himself; in the College he had a very large\nparty; and as to new acquisition, he had planned to become\nlord over Tuscany, he already possessed Perugia and Piom-\nbino, and he had taken Pisa under his protection. And, as\nsoon as he did not have to pay regard to France (which he\ndid not have to do any longer, since the French had already\nbeen stripped of the kingdom by the Spanish, so that each of\nthem was forced of necessity to buy his friendship), he\nwould have jumped on Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena\nwould have quickly yielded, in part through envy of the\nFlorentines, in part through fear; the Florentines had no\nremedy. If he had succeeded in this (as he was succeeding\nthe same year that Alexander died), he would have acquired\nsuch force and reputation that he would have stood by\nhimself and would no longer have depended on the fortune\nand force of someone else, but on his own power and\nvirtue. But Alexander died five years after he had begun to\ndraw his sword. He left the duke with only the state of\nRomagna consolidated, with all the others in the air, be-\ntween two very powerful enemy armies, and sick to death.\nAnd there was such ferocity and such virtue in the duke, and\nhe knew so well how men have to be won over or lost, and\n"
,"so sound were the foundations that he had laid in so little\ntime, that if he had not had these armies on his back or if\nhe had been healthy, he would have been equal to every\ndifficulty. And that his foundations were good one may see:\nRomagna waited for him for more than a month; in Rome,\nthough he was half-alive, he remained secure; and although\nthe Baglioni, Vitelli, and Orsini came to Rome, none fol-\nlowed them against him; if he could not make pope whom-\never he wanted, at least it would not be someone he did not\nwant. But if at the death of Alexander the duke had been\nhealthy, everything would have been easy for him. And he\ntold me, on the day that Julius II was created, that he had\nthought about what might happen when his father was\ndying, and had found a remedy for everything, except that\nhe never thought that at his death he himself would also be\non the point of dying.\n\nThus, if I summed up all the actions of the duke, I\nwould not know how to reproach him; on the contrary, it\nseems to me he should be put forward, as I have done, to be\nimitated by all those who have risen to empire through\nfortune and by the arms of others. For with his great spirit\nand high intention, he could not have conducted himself\notherwise and the only things in the way of his plans were\nthe brevity of Alexander's life and his own sickness. So\nwhoever judges it necessary in his new principality to secure\nhimself against enemies, to gain friends to himself, to con-\nquer either by force or by fraud, to make himself loved\nand feared by the people, and followed and revered by the\nsoldiers, to eliminate those who can or might offend you,\nto renew old orders through new modes, to be severe and\npleasant, magnanimous and liberal, to eliminate an un-\nfaithful military, to create a new one, to maintain friend-\n"
,"ships with kings and princes so that they must either benefit\nyou with favor or be hesitant to offend you\u2014can find no\nfresher examples than the actions of that man. One could\nonly accuse him in the creation of Julius as pontiff, in which\nhe made a bad choice; for, as was said, though he could not\nmake a pope to suit himself, he could have kept anyone\nfrom being pope. And for the papacy he should never have\nconsented to those cardinals whom he had offended or who,\nhaving become pope, would have to be afraid of him. For\nmen offend either from fear or for hatred. Those whom he\nhad offended were, among others, San Piero ad Vincula,\nColonna, San Giorgio, Ascanio; all the others, if they had\nbecome pope, would have had to fear him, except Rouen\nand the Spaniards, the latter because of kinship and obliga-\ntion, the former for his power, because he was connected\nto the kingdom of France. Therefore the duke, before\neverything else, should have created a Spaniard pope, and if\nhe could not, should have consented to Rouen, and not San\nPiero ad Vincula. And whoever believes that among great\npersonages new benefits will make old injuries be forgotten\ndeceives himself. So the duke erred in this choice and it\nwas the cause of his ultimate ruin."
,"VIII\n\nOf Those Who Have Attained a\nPrincipality through Crimes\n\nBut, because one becomes prince from private individual\nalso by two modes which cannot be altogether attributed\neither to fortune or to virtue, I do not think they should be\nleft out, although one of them can be reasoned about more\namply where republics are treated. These are when one\nascends to a principality by some criminal and nefarious path\nor when a private citizen becomes prince of his fatherland\nby the support of his fellow citizens. And, to speak of the\nfirst mode, it will be shown with two examples, one ancient,\nthe other modern, without entering otherwise into the\nmerits of this issue, because I judge it sufficient, for whoever\nwould find it necessary, to imitate them.\n\nAgathocles the Sicilian became king of Syracuse not\nonly from private fortune but from a mean and abject one.\nBorn of a potter, he always kept to a life of crime at every\nrank of his career; nonetheless, his crimes were accom-\npanied with such virtue of spirit and body that when he\nturned to the military, he rose through its ranks to become\npraetor of Syracuse. After he was established in that rank, he\ndecided to become prince and to hold with violence and\nwithout obligation to anyone else that which had been\nconceded to him by agreement. Having given intelligence\nof his plan to Hamilcar the Carthaginian, who was with his\narmies fighting in Sicily, one morning he assembled the\npeople and Senate of Syracuse as if he had to decide things\npertinent to the republic. At a signal he had ordered, he had\nall the senators and the richest of the people killed by his"
,"soldiers. Once they were dead, he seized and held the prin-\ncipate of that city without any civil controversy. And\nalthough he was defeated twice by the Carthaginians and in\nthe end besieged, not only was he able to defend his city but\nalso, leaving part of his men for defense against the siege,\nhe attacked Africa with the others. In a short time he freed\nSyracuse from the siege and brought the Carthaginians to\ndire necessity; they were compelled of necessity to come to\nan agreement with him, to be content with the possession of\nAfrica, and to leave Sicily to Agathocles. Thus, whoever\nmight consider the actions and virtue of this man will see\nnothing or little that can be attributed to fortune. For as was\nsaid above, not through anyone\u2019s support but through the\nranks of the military, which he had gained for himself with a\nthousand hardships and dangers, he came to the principate\nand afterwards he maintained it with many spirited and\ndangerous policies. Yet one cannot call it virtue to kill one\u2019s\ncitizens, betray one\u2019s friends, to be without faith, without\nmercy, without religion; these modes can enable one to\nacquire empire, but not glory. For, if one considers the\nvirtue of Agathocles in entering into and escaping from\ndangers, and the greatness of his spirit in enduring and\novercoming adversities, one does not see why he has to be\njudged inferior to any most excellent captain. Nonetheless,\nhis savage cruelty and inhumanity, together with his infinite\ncrimes, do not permit him to be celebrated among the most\nexcellent men. Thus, one cannot attribute to fortune or to\nvirtue what he achieved without either.\n\nIn our times, during the reign of Alexander VI, Liv-\nerotto da Fermo, having been left a fatherless child some\nyears before, was brought up by a maternal uncle of his\n"
,"called Giovanni Fogliani, and in the first years of his youth\nhe was sent out to soldier under Paolo Vitelli so that when\nhe was versed in that discipline, he would attain an excellent\nrank in the military. Then when Paolo died, he fought under\nVitellozzo, his brother, and in a very short time, since he was\ningenious and dashing in person and spirit, he became the\nfirst man in his military. But as it appeared to him servile to\nbe at the level of others, he thought that with the aid of\ncertain citizens of Fermo to whom servitude was dearer\nthan the liberty of their fatherland, and with support from\nthe Vitelli, he would seize Fermo. And he wrote to Gio-\nvanni Fogliani that since he had been away from home a few\nyears, he wanted to come to see him and his city, and in\nsome part to acknowledge his patrimony; and because he\nhad not troubled himself for anything but to acquire honor,\nhe wanted to come in honorable fashion accompanied by a\nhundred horsemen of his friends and servants, so that his\ncitizens might see that he had not spent the time in vain. He\nbegged Giovanni to please order that he be received honor-\nably by the inhabitants of Fermo, which would direct honor\nnot only to him but to Giovanni himself, since Liverotto\nwas his ward. Thereupon Giovanni did not fail in any prop-\ner duty to his nephew; and when Liverotto had been honor-\nably received by the inhabitants of Fermo, he was lodged in\nGiovanni\u2019s house. There, after a few days had passed, and\nafter he had waited to order secretly what was necessary for\nhis future crime, he held a most solemn banquet to which\nhe invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the first men of Fermo.\nAnd when the food and all other entertainments customary\nat such banquets had been enjoyed, Liverotto, with cun-\nning, opened certain grave discussions, speaking of the"
,"greatness of Pope Alexander and of Cesare Borgia, his son,\nand of their undertakings. While Giovanni and the others\nwere responding to these discussions, Liverotto at a stroke\nstood up, saying that these were things that should be spoken\nof in a more secret place; and he withdrew to a room into\nwhich Giovanni and all the other citizens came behind him.\nNo sooner were they seated than soldiers came out of secret\nplaces and killed Giovanni and all the others. After this\nhomicide, Liverotto mounted on horse, rode through the\ntown and besieged the highest magistracy in the palace so\nthat through fear they were compelled to obey him and to\nestablish a government of which he was made prince. And\nsince all those who could have hurt him because they were\nmalcontent were dead, he strengthened himself with new\ncivil and military orders, so that in the period of one year\nthat he held the principality, he was not only secure in the\ncity of Fermo but had become fearsome to all his neighbors.\nAnd to overthrow him would have been as difficult as to\noverthrow Agathocles if he had not permitted himself to be\ndeceived by Cesare Borgia when at Sinigaglia, as was said\nabove, he took the Orsini and the Vitelli. There Liverotto\ntoo was taken, one year after the parricide he committed,\nand together with Vitellozzo, who had been his master in\nhis virtues and crimes, he was strangled.\n\nSomeone could question how it happened that Agath-\nocles and anyone like him, after infinite betrayals and\ncruelties, could live for a long time secure in his father-\nland, defend himself against external enemies, and never be\nconspired against by his citizens, inasmuch as many others\nhave not been able to maintain their states through cruelty\neven in peaceful times, not to mention uncertain times of\nwar. I believe that this comes from cruelties badly used or\nwell used. Those can be called well used (if it is permissible\nto speak well of evil) that are done at a stroke, out of the"
,"necessity to secure oneself, and then are not persisted in but\nare turned to as much utility for the subjects as one can.\nThose cruelties are badly used which, though few in the\nbeginning, rather grow with time than are eliminated.\nThose who observe the first mode can have some remedy\nfor their state with God and with men, as had Agathocles; as\nfor the others it is impossible for them to maintain them-\nselves.\n\nHence it should be noted that in taking hold of a state,\nhe who seizes it should review all the offenses necessary for\nhim to commit, and do them all at a stroke, so as not to have\nto renew them every day and, by not renewing them, to\nsecure men and gain them to himself with benefits. Who-\never does otherwise, either through timidity or through bad\ncounsel, is always under necessity to hold a knife in his hand;\nnor can one ever found himself on his subjects if, because of\nfresh and continued injuries, they cannot be secure against\nhim. For injuries must be done all together, so that, being\ntasted less, they offend less; and benefits should be done little\nby little so that they may be tasted better. And above all, a\nprince should live with his subjects so that no single accident\nwhether bad or good has to make him change; for when\nnecessities come in adverse times you will not be in time for\nevil, and the good that you do does not help you, because\nit is judged to be forced on you, and cannot bring you\nany gratitude.\n\n\nIX\n\nOf the Civil Principality\n\nBut, coming to the other policy, when a private citizen\nbecomes prince of his fatherland, not through crime or\n"
,"other intolerable violence but with the support of his fellow\ncitizens (which one could call a civil principality; neither all\nvirtue nor all fortune is necessary to attain it, but rather a\nfortunate astuteness) \u2014I say that one ascends to this princi-\npality either with the support of the people or with the\nsupport of the great. For in every city these two diverse\nhumors are found, which arises from this: that the people\ndesire neither to be commanded nor oppressed by the great,\nand the great desire to command and oppress the people.\nFrom these two diverse appetites one of three effects occurs\nin cities: principality or liberty or license.\n\nPrincipality is caused either by the people or by the\ngreat, according to which of these sides has the opportunity\nfor it. For when the great see they cannot resist the people,\nthey begin to give reputation to one of themselves, and they\nmake him prince so that they can vent their appetite under\nhis shadow. So too, the people, when they see they cannot\nresist the great, give reputation to one, and make him prince\nso as to be defended with his authority. He who comes to\nthe principality with the aid of the great maintains himself\nwith more difficulty than one who becomes prince with the\naid of the people, because the former finds himself prince\nwith many around him who appear to be his equals, and\nbecause of this he can neither command them nor manage\nthem to suit himself. But he who arrives in the principality\nwith popular support finds himself alone there, and around\nhim has either no one or very few who are not ready to\nobey. Besides this, one cannot satisfy the great with de-\ncency and without injury to others, but one can satisfy the\npeople; for the end of the people is more decent than that of\nthe great, since the great want to oppress and the people\nwant not to be oppressed. Furthermore, a prince can never\nsecure himself against a hostile people, as they are too\nmany; against the great, he can secure himself, as they are\nfew. The worst that a prince can expect from a hostile\npeople is to be abandoned by it; but from the great, when\nthey are hostile, he must fear not only being abandoned but\n"
,"also that they may come against him, for since there is more\nforesight and more astuteness in the great, they always move\nin time to save themselves, and they seek rank from those\nthey hope will win. Also, the prince always lives of necessity\nwith the same people, but he can well do without the same\ngreat persons, since he can make and unmake them every\nday, and take away and give them reputation at his conve-\nnience.\n\nAnd to better clarify this issue, I say that the great must\nbe considered in two modes chiefly. Either they conduct\nthemselves so that in their proceedings they are obligated\nin everything to your fortune, or not. Those who are obli-\ngated, and are not rapacious, must be honored and loved;\nthose who are not obligated have to be examined in two\nmodes. Either they do this out of pusillanimity and a natural\ndefect of spirit; then you must make use especially of those\nwho are of good counsel, because in prosperity they bring\nyou honor and in adversity you do not have to fear them;\nbut, when by art and for an ambitious cause, they are not\nobligated, it is a sign that they are thinking more for them-\nselves than for you; and the prince must be on guard against\nthem, and fear them as if they were open enemies, because\nin adversity they will always help ruin him.\n\nTherefore, one who becomes prince through the sup-\nport of the people should keep them friendly to him, which\nshould be easy for him because they ask of him only that\nthey not be oppressed. But one who becomes prince against\nthe people with the support of the great must before every-\nthing else seek to gain the people to himself, which should\nbe easy for him when he takes up its protection. And since\nmen who receive good from someone from whom they\nbelieved they would receive evil are more obligated to\ntheir benefactor, the people immediately wish him well\nmore than if he had been brought to the principality with\ntheir support. The prince can gain the people to himself\nin many modes, for which one cannot give certain rules\n"
,"because the modes vary according to circumstances, and so\nthey will be left out. I will conclude only that for a prince it\nis necessary to have the people friendly; otherwise he has no\nremedy in adversity.\n\nNabis, prince of the Spartans, withstood a siege by all\nGreece and by one of Rome\u2019s most victorious armies, and\ndefended his fatherland and his state against them: and when\ndanger supervened it was enough for him to secure himself\nonly against a few, which would not have been enough if he\nhad had a hostile people. And let no one resist my opinion\non this with that trite proverb, that whoever founds on the\npeople founds on mud. For that is true when a private\ncitizen lays his foundation on them, and allows himself to\nthink that the people will liberate him if he is oppressed by\nenemies or by the magistrates (in this case one can often be\ndeceived, like the Gracchi in Rome and Messer Giorgio\nScali in Florence). But when a prince who founds on the\npeople knows how to command and is a man full of heart,\ndoes not get frightened in adversity, does not fail to make\nother preparations, and with his spirit and his orders keeps\nthe generality of people inspired, he will never find himself\ndeceived by them and he will see he has laid his foundations\nwell.\n\nThese principalities customarily run into peril when\n"
,"they are about to ascend from a civil order to an absolute\none. For these princes either command by themselves or by\nmeans of magistrates. In the latter case their position is\nweaker and more dangerous because they remain altogether\nat the will of those citizens who have been put in the magis-\ntracies, who, especially in adverse times, can take away his\nstate with great ease either by turning against him or by not\nobeying him. And the prince does not have time in the\nmidst of danger to seize absolute authority because the citi-\nzens and subjects, who are accustomed to receive com-\nmands from the magistrates, are not ready, in these emer-\ngencies, to obey his; he will always have, in uncertain times,\na shortage of those one can trust. For such a prince cannot\nfound himself on what he sees in quiet times, when citizens\nhave need of the state, because then everyone runs, every-\none promises, and each wants to die for him when death is\nat a distance; but in adverse times, when the state has need of\ncitizens, then few of them are to be found. And this test is all\nthe more dangerous since one cannot make it but once. And\nso a wise prince must think of a way by which his citizens,\nalways and in every quality of time, have need of the state\nand of himself; and then they will always be faithful to him.\n\n\nX\n\nIn What Mode the Forces of All\nPrincipalities Should Be Measured\n\nIn examining the qualities of these principalities one must\nadmit another consideration; that is, whether a prince has\nenough of a state that he can rule by himself when he needs\nto, or whether he is always under the necessity of being\ndefended by others. And, to better clarify this issue, I say\n"
,"that I judge those capable of ruling by themselves who can,\nby abundance of either men or money, put together an\nadequate army and fight a battle against whoever comes to\nattack them; and I judge as well that those always have\nnecessity of others who cannot appear in the field against an\nenemy, but are compelled of necessity to take refuge behind\nwalls and to guard them. The first case has been discussed,\nand in what is to come we will say what is required for it. In\nthe second case one can only exhort such princes to fortify\nand supply their own towns, and to take no account of the\ncountryside. And whoever has fortified his town well, and\nhas managed the other governing of his subjects as was said\nabove and will be said below, will be attacked always with\ngreat hesitation; for men are always hostile to undertakings\nwhere difficulties may be seen, and one can see it is not easy\nto attack one who has a strong town and is not hated by\nthe people.\n\nThe cities of Germany are very free, have little coun-\ntryside, and obey the emperor when they want to; they do\nnot fear either him or any other power around, because they\nare so well fortified that everyone thinks their capture\nwould be toilsome and difficult. For all of them have suit-\nable ditches and walls, and sufficient artillery; they always\nkeep in their public stores enough to drink and to eat and to\nburn for a year. Besides this, so as to keep the plebs fed\nwithout loss to the public, they always keep in common\nsupply enough to be able to give them work for a year in\nemployments that are the nerve and the life of that city and\nof the industries from which the plebs is fed. They still hold\n"
,"military exercises in repute, and they have many institu-\ntions to maintain them.\n\nThus a prince who has a strong city and does not make\nhimself hated cannot be attacked; and if indeed there is\nsomeone who would attack him, he would have to retreat\nin shame, for worldly things are so variable that it is next to\nimpossible for one to stand with his armies idle in a siege for\na year. And someone might reply: if the people have their\npossessions outside, and see them burning, they will not\nhave patience for this, and the long siege and their love for\ntheir own will make them forget the prince. I respond that a\npowerful and spirited prince will always overcome all these\ndifficulties, now by giving hope to his subjects that the evil\nwill not last long, now by giving them fear of the enemy\u2019s\ncruelty, now by securing himself skillfully against those who\nappear to him too bold. Besides this, the enemy reasonably\nwould burn and ruin the countryside on his arrival, at a time\nwhen men\u2019s spirits are still hot and willing for defense; and\nthus the prince should hesitate so much the less, because\nafter several days, when spirits have cooled, the damage has\nalready been done, the evil has been received, and there is\nno more remedy for it. At that time they come to unite with\ntheir prince so much the more, since it appears he has an\nobligation toward them, their houses having been burned\nand their possessions ruined in his defense. And the nature\nof men is to be obligated as much by benefits they give as by\nbenefits they receive. Hence, if one considers all this well, it\nshould not be difficult for a prudent prince to keep the spirits\nof his citizens firm in the siege, at first and later, provided he\ndoes not lack the wherewithal for life and for defense.\n"
,"XI\n\nOf Ecclesiastical Principalities\n\nIt remains now only to reason about ecclesiastical princi-\npalities. All difficulties regarding them come before they\nare possessed, because they are acquired either by virtue or\nby fortune and are maintained without the one or the other,\nfor they are sustained by orders that have grown old with\nreligion, which have been so powerful and of such a kind\nthat they keep their princes in the state however they pro-\nceed and live. These alone have states, and do not defend\nthem; they have subjects, and do not govern them; and the\nstates, though undefended, are not taken from them; the\nsubjects, though ungoverned, do not care, and they neither\nthink of becoming estranged from such princes nor can\nthey. Thus, only these principalities are secure and happy.\nBut as they subsist by superior causes, to which the hu-\nman mind does not reach, I will omit speaking of them; for\nsince they are exalted and maintained by God, it would\nbe the office of a presumptuous and foolhardy man to dis-\ncourse on them. Nonetheless, if someone were to inquire of\nme how it came about that the Church has come to such\ngreatness in temporal affairs despite the fact that, before\nAlexander, the Italian powers, and not only those that are\ncalled powers but every baron and lord, even the least, held\nher in low esteem in temporal affairs \u2014and now a king of\nFrance trembles at her and she has been able to remove him\nfrom Italy and to ruin the Venetians \u2014 though this is known,\nit does not seem to me superfluous to recall a good part of it\nto memory.\n\nBefore Charles, king of France, came into Italy,\nthis province was under the power of the pope, the Vene-\n"
,"tians, the king of Naples, the duke of Milan, and the Floren-\ntines. These powers had to have two principal concerns:\none, that a foreigner not enter into Italy with arms; the\nother, that none of them enlarge his state. Those who con-\ncerned them the most were the pope and the Venetians. And\nto hold back the Venetians the union of all the others was\nneeded, as in the defense of Ferrara; to hold down the pope\nthey made use of the barons in Rome. Since these were\ndivided into two factions, Orsini and Colonna, there was\nalways cause for quarrel between them; and standing with\narms in hand under the eyes of the pontiff, they kept the\npontificate weak and infirm. And although a spirited pope,\nlike Sixtus, sometimes rose up, still fortune or wisdom\ncould never release him from these inconveniences. And\nthe brevity of their lives was the cause of it; for in the ten\nyears on the average that a pope lived, he would have trouble\nputting down one of the factions. If, for instance, one pope\nhad almost eliminated the Colonna, another one hostile to\nthe Orsini rose up, which made the Colonna rise again, and\nthere would not be time to eliminate the Orsini.\n\nThis brought the temporal forces of the pope to be\nheld in low esteem in Italy. Then Alexander VI arose; of all\nthe pontiffs there have ever been he showed how far a pope\ncould prevail with money and forces. With Duke Valentino\nas his instrument and with the invasion of the French as the\nopportunity, he did all the things I discussed above in the\nactions of the duke. And though his intent might not have\nbeen to make the Church great, but rather the duke, none-\n"
,"theless what he did redounded to the greatness of the\nChurch. After his death, the duke being eliminated, the\nChurch fell heir to his labors. Then came Pope Julius, and\nhe found the Church great, since she had all Romagna, had\neliminated the barons in Rome, and had annihilated those\nfactions through the blows struck by Alexander; Julius\nfound the path still open to a mode of accumulating money,\nnever used before Alexander. These things Julius not only\ncontinued but increased; and he thought about how to gain\nBologna for himself, eliminate the Venetians, and expel the\nFrench from Italy. All these enterprises succeeded for him,\nand with all the more praise, inasmuch as he did everything\nfor the increase of the Church and not of some private\nindividual. He also kept the Orsini and Colonna parties\nwithin the same limits in which he found them; and al-\nthough there might be some head among them ready to\nmake a change, still two things restrained them: one, the\ngreatness of the Church, which frightened them; the other,\nnot having cardinals of their own, for they are the origin of\nthe tumults among them. Nor will these parties ever be\nquiet as long as they have cardinals; for cardinals nourish\nparties, within Rome and without, and the barons are\nforced to defend them. Thus, from the ambition of prelates\narise disorders and tumults among the barons. His Holiness\nPope Leo, then, has found this pontificate most powerful;\none may hope that if the others made it great with arms, he,\nwith his goodness and infinite other virtues, can make it\nvery great and venerable.\n"
,"XII\n\nHow Many Kinds of Military\nThere Are and Concerning\nMercenary Soldiers\n\nHaving discoursed in particular on all the qualities of those\nprincipalities which at the beginning I proposed to reason\nabout, having considered in some part the causes of their\nwell-being and ill-being, and having shown the modes in\nwhich many have sought to acquire and hold them, it re-\nmains for me now to discourse generally on the offense and\ndefense befitting each of those named. We have said above\nthat it is necessary for a prince to have good foundations for\nhimself; otherwise he must of necessity be ruined. The\nprincipal foundations that all states have, new ones as well as\nold or mixed, are good laws and good arms. And because\nthere cannot be good laws where there are not good arms,\nand where there are good arms there must be good laws,\nI shall leave out the reasoning on laws and shall speak of\narms.\n\nI say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince\ndefends his state are either his own or mercenary or auxiliary\nor mixed. Mercenary and auxiliary arms are useless and\ndangerous; and if one keeps his state founded on mercenary\narms, one will never be firm or secure; for they are dis-\nunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; bold\namong friends, among enemies cowardly; no fear of God,\nno faith with men; ruin is postponed only as long as attack is\npostponed; and in peace you are despoiled by them, in war\nby the enemy. The cause of this is that they have no love nor\ncause to keep them in the field other than a small stipend,\n"
,"which is not sufficient to make them want to die for you.\nThey do indeed want to be your soldiers while you are not\nmaking war, but when war comes, they either flee or leave.\nIt should be little trouble for me to persuade anyone of this\npoint, because the present ruin of Italy is caused by nothing\nother than its having relied for a period of many years on\nmercenary arms. These arms once made some progress for\nsome, and may have appeared bold among themselves; but\nwhen the foreigner came, they showed what they were.\nHence Charles, king of France, was allowed to seize Italy\nwith chalk. And he who said that our sins were the cause of\nit spoke the truth. But the sins were surely not those he\nbelieved, but the ones I have told of, and because these were\nthe sins of princes, they too have suffered the punishment\nfor them.\n\nI want to demonstrate better the failure of these arms.\nMercenary captains are either excellent men of arms or not:\nif they are, you cannot trust them because they always as-\npire to their own greatness, either by oppressing you, who\nare their patron, or by oppressing others contrary to your\nintention; but if the captain is not virtuous, he ruins you in\nthe ordinary way. And if one responds that whoever has\narms in hand will do this, mercenary or not, I would reply\nthat arms have to be employed either by a prince or by a\nrepublic. The prince should go in person, and perform him-\nself the office of captain. The republic has to send its cit-\nizens, and when it sends one who does not turn out to be a\n"
,"worthy man, it must change him; and if he is, it must check\nhim with laws so that he does not step out of bounds.\nAnd by experience one sees that only princes and armed\nrepublics make very great progress; nothing but harm ever\ncomes from mercenary arms. And a republic armed with its\nown arms is brought to obey one of its citizens with more\ndifficulty than is a republic armed with foreign arms.\n\nRome and Sparta stood for many centuries armed and\nfree. The Swiss are very well armed and very free. The\nCarthaginians are an example of ancient mercenary arms;\nthey were nearly oppressed by their own mercenary sol-\ndiers at the end of the first war with the Romans, even\nthough the Carthaginians had their own citizens as heads.\nAfter the death of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was\nmade captain of their troops by the Thebans; and after his\nvictory he took their liberty from them. The Milanese,\nafter Duke Filippo died, hired Francesco Sforza against the\nVenetians; when he had overcome the enemy at Caravag-\ngio, he joined with them to oppress the Milanese, his pa-\ntrons. Sforza\u2019s father, in the hire of Queen Giovanna of Na-\nples, at a stroke left her disarmed; then, so as not to lose the\nkingdom, she was compelled to throw herself in the lap of\nthe king of Aragon. And, if the Venetians and the Floren-\ntines have in the past increased their empire with these arms,\nand their captains did not thereupon make themselves\nprinces but defended them, I respond that the Florentines\n"
,"were favored by chance in this case, because, of the virtuous\ncaptains whom they could have feared, some did not win,\nsome had opposition, others turned their ambition else-\nwhere. The one who did not win was Giovanni Acuto.\nSince he did not win, one could not know his faith, but\neveryone will confess that if he had won, the Florentines\nwould have been at his discretion. Sforza always had the\nBracceschi against him, so that each watched the other:\nFrancesco turned his ambition to Lombardy, Braccio against\nthe Church and the kingdom of Naples.\n\nBut let us come to what happened a little while ago.\nThe Florentines took as their captain Paolo Vitelli, a most\nprudent man who from private fortune had secured very\ngreat reputation. If he had captured Pisa, no one would\ndeny that the Florentines would have had to stay with him,\nbecause if he had gone over in hire to their enemies, they\nwould have had no remedy; and if they had kept him, they\nwould have had to obey him. If one considers the progress\nof the Venetians, one will see that they acted securely and\ngloriously while they themselves made war (which was be-\nfore they turned to enterprises on land). With their own\ngentry and armed plebs, they performed most virtuously,\nbut when they began to fight on land, they left this virtue\nbehind and they followed the customs of wars in Italy. And\nat the beginning of their expansion on land, because they\ndid not have much of a state there and because they were\nheld in great repute, they did not have much to fear from\ntheir captains; but as they expanded, which was under Car-\nmagnola, they suffered an instance of this error. For when\nthey saw he was most virtuous, since the duke of Milan had\n"
,"been defeated by them under his government, and when\nthey learned on the other hand that he had turned cool\ntoward the war, they judged they could no longer win with\nhim because he did not want to, nor could they dismiss him\nwithout losing what they had acquired. So in order to secure\nthemselves, they were forced of necessity to kill him. Then\nthey had as their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto\nda San Severino, the count of Pitigliano, and such. With\nthese they had to fear for loss, not for their gain, as then\nhappened at Vail\u00e0: there they lost in one day what they had\nacquired with such trouble in eight hundred years. For\nthese arms bring only slow, late, and weak acquisitions,\nbut sudden and miraculous losses. And because with these\nexamples I have come into Italy, which has been governed\nfor many years by mercenary arms, I want to discourse on\nthem more deeply, so that, when their origin and progress\nhave been seen, one can correct them better.\n\nSo you have to understand that in recent times as\nsoon as Italy began to repel the empire, and the pope gained\nmuch reputation in temporal affairs, Italy divided into\nmany states. For many of the large cities took up arms\nagainst their nobles, who formerly, supported by the em-\nperor, had kept them under oppression; and the Church\nsupported the cities to give herself reputation in temporal\naffairs. In many other cities their citizens became princes\nover them. Hence, since Italy had almost fallen into the\nhands of the Church and a few republics, and since the\npriests and the other citizens did not have knowledge of\narms, they began to hire foreigners. The first who gave\nreputation to this kind of military was Alberigo da Conio,\n"
,"from Romagna. From his discipline came, among others,\nBraccio and Sforza, who in their times were the arbiters of\nItaly. After them came all the others who have governed\nthese arms until our times. And the result of their virtue has\nbeen that Italy has been overrun by Charles, taken as booty\nby Louis, violated by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Swiss.\nThe order they have held to has been, first, to take away\nreputation from the infantry in order to give reputation to\nthemselves. They did this because they were men without a\nstate who lived on industry. Having a few infantry did not\ngive them reputation and they could not feed very many; so\nthey were left with horse, and were fed and honored in\ntolerable number. And things came to the point that in an\narmy of twenty thousand soldiers not two thousand infan-\ntry were to be found. Besides this, they had used all their\nindustry to rid themselves and the soldiers of trouble and\nfear by not killing one another in battles but taking pris-\noners without asking ransom. They did not go against\ntowns in the night; those in the towns would not go against\ntheir tents; around the camp they made neither stockade nor\ntrench; they did not campaign in winter. And all these\nthings were permitted in their military orders and dis-\ncovered by them, as has been said, so as to escape trouble\nand dangers, so that they have led Italy into slavery and\ndisgrace.\n"
,"XIII\n\nOf Auxiliary, Mixed, and One\u2019s\nOwn Soldiers\n\nAuxiliary arms, which are the other useless arms, are those\nof a power that is called to come with its arms to help and\ndefend you, as was done by Pope Julius in recent times.\nWhen he had seen in the campaign of Ferrara the sad result\nof his mercenary arms, he turned to auxiliary ones; and he\nagreed with Ferdinand, king of Spain, that Ferdinand\nwould help him with his men and armies. These arms can\nbe useful and good in themselves, but for whoever calls\nthem in, they are almost always harmful, because when\nthey lose you are undone; when they win, you are left their\nprisoner. And although ancient histories are full of exam-\nples, nonetheless I do not wish to depart from this recent\nexample of Pope Julius II, whose course of thrusting himself\nentirely into the hands of a foreigner, when he wanted\nFerrara, could not have been less thought out. But his good\nfortune gave rise to a third thing so that he did not reap the\nfruit of his bad choice; for when his auxiliaries were defeated\nat Ravenna, the Swiss rose up and, beyond all expec-\ntation, his own and others, drove out the victors; and he\ncame out a prisoner neither of his enemies, who had fled,\nnor of his auxiliaries, since he had won with other arms\nthan theirs. The Florentines, who were entirely unarmed,\nbrought in ten thousand French to Pisa to capture it, for\nwhich course they incurred more danger than in any other\ntime of their travails. The emperor of Constantinople, so as\nto oppose his neighbors, sent ten thousand Turks into\nGreece; when the war was finished, they refused to leave.\n"
,"This was the beginning of the servitude of Greece under\nthe infidels.\n\nLet him, then, who wants to be unable to win make\nuse of these arms, since they are much more dangerous than\nmercenary arms. For with these, ruin is accomplished; they\nare all united, all resolved to obey someone else. But merce-\nnary arms, when they have won, need more time and\ngreater opportunity to hurt you, since they are not one\nwhole body and have been found and paid for by you. In\nthem the third party whom you may put at their head\ncannot quickly seize so much authority as to offend you.\nIn sum, in mercenary arms laziness is more dangerous; in\nauxiliary arms, virtue is.\n\nA wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms\nand turned to his own. He has preferred to lose with his own\nthan to win with others, since he judges it no true victory\nthat is acquired with alien arms. I shall never hesitate to\ncite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke came into\nRomagna with auxiliary arms, leading there entirely French\ntroops, with whom he took Imola and Forl\u00ec. But when\nsuch arms no longer appeared safe to him, he turned to\nmercenaries, judging there to be less danger in them; and he\nhired the Orsini and Vitelli. Then in managing them, he\nfound them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous; he elimi-\nnated them, and turned to his own arms. And one can easily\nsee the difference between these arms if one considers what\na difference there was in the reputation of the duke when\nhe had only the French, and when he had the Orsini and\nVitelli, and when he was left with his own soldiers and\nhimself over them: his reputation will be found always to\nhave increased, but he was never so much esteemed as when\neveryone saw that he was the total owner of his arms.\n\nI did not want to depart from examples that are Italian\nand recent; yet I do not want to leave out Hiero of Syracuse,\nsince he was one of those named above by me. When he, as\n"
,"I said, was made head of the army by the Syracusans, he\nknew immediately that their mercenary military was not\nuseful because they were condottieri set up like our Italians.\nSince he thought he could neither keep them nor let them\ngo, he had them all cut to pieces, and then made war with\nhis arms and not with alien arms. I want further to recall to\nmemory a figure of the Old Testament apt for this purpose.\nWhen David offered to Saul to go and fight Goliath, the\nPhilistine challenger, Saul, to give him spirit, armed him\nwith his own arms \u2014which David, as soon as he had them\non, refused, saying that with them he could not give a good\naccount of himself, and so he would rather meet the enemy\nwith his sling and his knife.\n\nIn fine, the arms of others either fall off your back or\nweigh you down or hold you tight. Charles VII, father of\nKing Louis XI, who had liberated France from the English\nwith his fortune and virtue, recognized this necessity of\narming himself with his own arms, and laid down an ordi-\nnance in his kingdom for men-at-arms and infantry. Then\nhis son King Louis eliminated the ordinance for infantry\nand began to hire Swiss; this error, continued by others, is,\nas one sees now in fact, the cause of the dangers to that\nkingdom. For when he gave reputation to the Swiss, he\ndebased all his own arms, because he had eliminated the\ninfantry entirely and he had obligated his men-at-arms to\nthe arms of others. For after they had become accustomed\nto fighting with Swiss, they did not think they could win\nwithout them. From this it follows that French are not\nenough against Swiss and without Swiss do not try against\nanyone else. Thus, the armies of France have been mixed,\npart mercenary and part their own. These arms all together\nare much better than simple auxiliary or simple mercenary\n"
,"arms, but much inferior to one\u2019s own. And the example\ngiven is enough, because the kingdom of France would be\nunconquerable if the ordering of Charles had been ex-\npanded or preserved. But lack of prudence in men begins\nsomething in which, because it tastes good then, they do\nnot perceive the poison that lies underneath, as I said above\nof consumptive fevers.\n\nTherefore, he who does not recognize evils when they\narise in a principality is not truly wise, and this is given to\nfew. And if one considers the first cause of the ruin of the\nRoman Empire, one will find it to have begun only with the\nhiring of Goths, because from that beginning the forces of\nthe Roman Empire began to weaken, and all the virtue that\nwas taken from it was given to them.\n\nI conclude, thus, that without its own arms no princi-\npality is secure; indeed it is wholly obliged to fortune since it\ndoes not have virtue to defend itself in adversity. And it has\nalways been the opinion and judgment of wise men \u201cthat\nnothing is so infirm and unstable as fame for power not\nsustained by one\u2019s own force.\u201d And one\u2019s own arms are\nthose which are composed of either subjects or citizens or\nyour creatures: all others are either mercenary or auxiliary.\nAnd the mode of ordering one\u2019s own arms will be easy to\nfind if one reviews the orders of the four I have named\nabove and if one sees how Philip, father of Alexander the\nGreat, and how many republics and princes have armed and\nordered themselves. I submit myself entirely to these orders."
,"XIV\n\nWhat a Prince Should Do\nRegarding the Military\n\nThus, a prince should have no other object, nor any other\nthought, nor take anything else as his art but that of war and\nits orders and discipline; for that is the only art which is of\nconcern to one who commands. And it is of such virtue that\nnot only does it maintain those who have been born princes\nbut many times it enables men of private fortune to rise to\nthat rank; and on the contrary, one sees that when princes\nhave thought more of amenities than of arms, they have lost\ntheir states. And the first cause that makes you lose it is the\nneglect of this art; and the cause that enables you to acquire\nit is to be a professional in this art.\n\nFrancesco Sforza, because he was armed, became duke\nof Milan from a private individual; and his sons, because\nthey shunned the hardships of arms, became private individ-\nuals from dukes. For, among the other causes of evil that\nbeing unarmed brings you, it makes you contemptible,\nwhich is one of those infamies the prince should be on guard\nagainst, as will be said below. For there is no proportion\nbetween one who is armed and one who is unarmed, and\nit is not reasonable that whoever is armed obey willingly\nwhoever is unarmed, and that someone unarmed be secure\namong armed servants. For since there is scorn in the one\nand suspicion in the other, it is not possible for them to work\nwell together. And therefore a prince who does not un-\nderstand the military, besides other unhappiness, cannot, as\nwas said, be esteemed by his soldiers nor have trust in them.\n"
,"Therefore, he should never lift his thoughts from the\nexercise of war, and in peace he should exercise it more\nthan in war. This he can do in two modes, one with deeds,\nthe other with the mind. And as to deeds, besides keeping\nhis armies well ordered and exercised, he should always\nbe out hunting, and through this accustom the body to\nhardships; and meanwhile he should learn the nature of\nsites, and recognize how mountains rise, how valleys open\nup, how plains lie, and understand the nature of rivers and\nmarshes \u2014and in this invest the greatest care. This knowl-\nedge is useful in two modes. First, one learns to know one\u2019s\nown country, and one can better understand its defense;\nthen, through the knowledge of and experience with those\nsites, one can comprehend with ease every other site that\nit may be necessary to explore as new. For the hills, the\nvalleys, the plains, the rivers, and the marshes that are in\nTuscany, for example, have a certain similarity to those of\nother provinces, so that from the knowledge of a site in one\nprovince one can easily come to the knowledge of others.\nAnd the prince who lacks this skill lacks the first part of what\na captain must have, for this teaches him to find the enemy,\nseize lodgings, lead armies, order battles, and besiege towns\nto your advantage.\n\nAmong other praise given by writers to Philopoemen,\nprince of the Achaeans, is that in times of peace he never\nthought of anything but modes of war; and when he was on\ncampaign with friends, he often stopped and reasoned with\nthem: \u201cIf the enemy were on top of that hill and we were\nhere with our army, which of us would have the advantage?\nHow could one advance to meet them while maintaining\n"
,"order? If we wanted to retreat from here, how would we\nhave to do it? If they retreated, how would we have to follow\nthem?\u201d And he put before them, as he went along, all the\nchances that can occur to an army; he listened to their\nopinions, gave his own, supported it with reasons, so that\nbecause of these continued cogitations there could never\narise, while he led the army, any accident for which he did\nnot have the remedy.\n\nBut, as to the exercise of the mind, a prince should read\nhistories and consider in them the actions of excellent men,\nshould see how they conducted themselves in wars, should\nexamine the causes of their victories and losses, so as to be\nable to avoid the latter and imitate the former. Above all he\nshould do as some excellent man has done in the past who\nfound someone to imitate who had been praised and glori-\nfied before him, whose exploits and actions he always kept\nbeside himself, as they say Alexander the Great imitated\nAchilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, Cyrus. And whoever\nreads the life of Cyrus written by Xenophon will then\nrecognize in the life of Scipio how much glory that imita-\ntion brought him, how much in chastity, affability, human-\nity, and liberality Scipio conformed to what had been writ-\nten of Cyrus by Xenophon.\n\nA wise prince should observe such modes, and never\nremain idle in peaceful times, but with his industry make\ncapital of them in order to be able to profit from them in\nadversities, so that when fortune changes, it will find him\nready to resist them.\n"
,"XV\n\nOf Those Things for Which Men\nAnd Especially Princes Are\nPraised or Blamed\n\nIt remains now to see what the modes and government of a\nprince should be with subjects and with friends. And be-\ncause I know that many have written of this, I fear that in\nwriting of it again, I may be held presumptuous, especially\nsince in disputing this matter I depart from the orders of\nothers. But since my intent is to write something useful to\nwhoever understands it, it has appeared to me more fitting\nto go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the\nimagination of it. And many have imagined republics and\nprincipalities that have never been seen or known to exist in\ntruth; for it is so far from how one lives to how one should\nlive that he who lets go of what is done for what should be\ndone learns his ruin rather than his preservation. For a man\nwho wants to make a profession of good in all regards must\ncome to ruin among so many who are not good. Hence it is\nnecessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to\nlearn to be able not to be good, and to use this and not use it\naccording to necessity.\n\nThus, leaving out what is imagined about a prince and\ndiscussing what is true, I say that all men, whenever one\nspeaks of them, and especially princes, since they are placed\nhigher, are noted for some of the qualities that bring them\neither blame or praise. And this is why someone is consid-\nered liberal, someone mean (using a Tuscan term because\navaro [avaricious] in our language is still one who desires to\nhave something by rapine, misero [mean] we call one who\nrefrains too much from using what is his); someone is con-\nsidered a giver, someone rapacious; someone cruel, some-\n"
,"one merciful; the one a breaker of faith, the other faithful;\nthe one effeminate and pusillanimous, the other fierce and\nspirited; the one humane, the other proud; the one lascivi-\nous, the other chaste; the one honest, the other astute; the\none hard, the other agreeable; the one grave, the other\nlight; the one religious, the other unbelieving, and the like.\nAnd I know that everyone will confess that it would be a\nvery praiseworthy thing to find in a prince all of the above-\nmentioned qualities that are held good. But because he\ncannot have them, nor wholly observe them, since human\nconditions do not permit it, it is necessary for him to be so\nprudent as to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices\nthat would take his state from him and to be on guard against\nthose that do not, if that is possible; but if one cannot, one\ncan let them go on with less hesitation. And furthermore\none should not care about incurring the fame of those vices\nwithout which it is difficult to save one\u2019s state; for if one\nconsiders everything well, one will find something appears\nto be virtue, which if pursued would be one\u2019s ruin, and\nsomething else appears to be vice, which if pursued results\nin one\u2019s security and well-being.\n\n\nXVI\n\nOf Liberality and Parsimony\n\nBeginning, then, with the first of the above-mentioned\nqualities, I say that it would be good to be held liberal;\nnonetheless, liberality, when used so that you may be held\n"
,"liberal, hurts you. For if it is used virtuously and as it should\nbe used, it may not be recognized, and you will not escape\nthe infamy of its contrary. And so, if one wants to maintain a\nname for liberality among men, it is necessary not to leave\nout any kind of lavish display, so that a prince who has done\nthis will always consume all his resources in such deeds. In\nthe end it will be necessary, if he wants to maintain a name\nfor liberality, to burden the people extraordinarily, to be\nrigorous with taxes, and to do all those things that can be\ndone to get money. This will begin to make him hated by his\nsubjects, and little esteemed by anyone as he becomes poor;\nso having offended the many and rewarded the few with this\nliberality of his, he feels every least hardship and runs into\nrisk at every slight danger. When he recognizes this, and\nwants to draw back from it, he immediately incurs the\ninfamy of meanness.\n\nThus, since a prince cannot, without damage to him-\nself, use the virtue of liberality so that it is recognized, he\nshould not, if he is prudent, care about a name for meanness.\nFor with time he will always be held more and more liberal\nwhen it is seen that with his parsimony his income is enough\nfor him, that he can defend himself from whoever makes\nwar on him, and that he can undertake campaigns without\nburdening the people. So he comes to use liberality with all\nthose from whom he does not take, who are infinite, and\nmeanness with all those to whom he does not give, who\nare few. In our times we have not seen great things done\nexcept by those who have been considered mean; the others\nhave been eliminated. Pope Julius II, while he made use\nof a name for liberality to attain the papacy, did not think of\nmaintaining it later, so as to be able to make war. The pres-\nent king of France has carried on many wars without\nimposing an extraordinary tax on his subjects, only because\n"
,"the extra expenses were administered with his long-\npracticed parsimony. If the present king of Spain had been\nheld liberal, he would not have been able to make or win so\nmany campaigns.\n\nTherefore, so as not to have to rob his subjects, to be\nable to defend himself, not to become poor and contempt-\nible, nor to be forced to become rapacious, a prince should\nesteem it little to incur a name for meanness, because this is\none of those vices which enable him to rule. And if someone\nshould say: Caesar attained empire with liberality, and many\nothers, because they have been and have been held to be\nliberal, have attained very great rank, I respond: either you\nare already a prince or you are on the path to acquiring it: in\nthe first case this liberality is damaging; in the second it is\nindeed necessary to be held liberal. And Caesar was one of\nthose who wanted to attain the principate of Rome; but if\nafter he had arrived there, had he remained alive and not\nbeen temperate with his expenses, he would have destroyed\nthat empire. And if someone should reply: many have been\nprinces and have done great things with their armies who\nhave been held very liberal, I respond to you: either the\nprince spends from what is his own and his subjects\u2019 or from\nwhat belongs to someone else. In the first case he should be\nsparing; in the other, he should not leave out any part of\nliberality. And for the prince who goes out with his armies,\nwho feeds on booty, pillage, and ransom and manages on\nwhat belongs to someone else, this liberality is necessary;\notherwise he would not be followed by his soldiers. And of\nwhat is not yours or your subjects\u2019 one can be a bigger giver,\nas were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander, because spend-\ning what is someone else\u2019s does not take reputation from\nyou but adds it to you; only spending your own is what\nharms you. And there is nothing that consumes itself as\nmuch as liberality: while you use it, you lose the capacity to\n"
,"use it; and you become either poor and contemptible or, to\nescape poverty, rapacious and hateful. Among all the things\nthat a prince should guard against is being contemptible and\nhated, and liberality leads you to both. So there is more\nwisdom in maintaining a name for meanness, which begets\ninfamy without hatred, than in being under a necessity,\nbecause one wants to have a name for liberality, to incur a\nname for rapacity, which begets infamy with hatred.\n\n\nXVII\n\nOf Cruelty and Mercy, and\nWhether It Is Better to Be Loved\nThan Feared, or the Contrary\n\nDescending next to the other qualities cited before, I say\nthat each prince should desire to be held merciful and not\ncruel; nonetheless he should take care not to use this mercy\nbadly. Cesare Borgia was held to be cruel; nonetheless his\ncruelty restored the Romagna, united it, and reduced it to\npeace and to faith. If one considers this well, one will see\nthat he was much more merciful than the Florentine people,\nwho so as to escape a name for cruelty, allowed Pistoia to be\ndestroyed. A prince, therefore, so as to keep his subjects\nunited and faithful, should not care about the infamy of\ncruelty, because with very few examples he will be more\nmerciful than those who for the sake of too much mercy\nallow disorders to continue, from which come killings or\n"
,"robberies; for these customarily hurt a whole community,\nbut the executions that come from the prince hurt one\nparticular person. And of all princes, it is impossible for the\nnew prince to escape a name for cruelty because new states\nare full of dangers. And Virgil says in the mouth of Dido:\n\u201cThe harshness of things and the newness of the kingdom\ncompel me to contrive such things, and to keep a broad\nwatch over the borders.\u201d\n\nNonetheless, he should be slow to believe and to\nmove, nor should he make himself feared, and he should\nproceed in a temperate mode with prudence and humanity\nso that too much confidence does not make him incautious\nand too much diffidence does not render him intolerable.\n\nFrom this a dispute arises whether it is better to be\nloved than feared, or the reverse. The response is that one\nwould want to be both the one and the other; but because it\nis difficult to put them together, it is much safer to be feared\nthan loved, if one has to lack one of the two. For one can\nsay this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle,\npretenders and dissemblers, evaders of danger, eager for\ngain. While you do them good, they are yours, offering you\ntheir blood, property, lives, and children, as I said above,\nwhen the need for them is far away; but, when it is close to\nyou, they revolt. And that prince who has founded himself\nentirely on their words, stripped of other preparation, is\nruined; for friendships that are acquired at a price and not\nwith greatness and nobility of spirit are bought, but they are\nnot owned and when the time comes they cannot be spent.\nAnd men have less hesitation to offend one who makes\nhimself loved than one who makes himself feared; for love is\nheld by a chain of obligation, which, because men are\n"
,"wicked, is broken at every opportunity for their own utility,\nbut fear is held by a dread of punishment that never forsakes\nyou.\n\nThe prince should nonetheless make himself feared in\nsuch a mode that if he does not acquire love, he escapes\nhatred, because being feared and not being hated can go\ntogether very well. This he will always do if he abstains from\nthe property of his citizens and his subjects, and from their\nwomen; and if he also needs to proceed against someone\u2019s\nlife, he must do it when there is suitable justification and\nmanifest cause for it. But above all, he must abstain from the\nproperty of others, because men forget the death of a father\nmore quickly than the loss of a patrimony. Furthermore,\ncauses for taking away property are never lacking, and he\nwho begins to live by rapine always finds cause to seize\nothers\u2019 property; and, on the contrary, causes for taking life\nare rarer and disappear more quickly.\n\nBut when the prince is with his armies and has a multi-\ntude of soldiers under his government, then it is above all\nnecessary not to care about a name for cruelty, because\nwithout this name he never holds his army united, or dis-\nposed to any action. Among the admirable actions of\nHannibal is numbered this one: that when he had a very\nlarge army, mixed with infinite kinds of men, and had led it\nto fight in alien lands, no dissension ever arose in it, neither\namong themselves nor against the prince, in bad as well as in\nhis good fortune. This could not have arisen from anything\nother than his inhuman cruelty which, together with his\ninfinite virtues, always made him venerable and terrible in\nthe sight of his soldiers; and without it, his other virtues\nwould not have sufficed to bring about this effect. And the\nwriters, having considered little in this, on the one hand\nadmire this action of his but on the other condemn the\nprincipal cause of it.\n"
,"And to see that it is true that his other virtues would\nnot have been enough, one can consider Scipio, who was\nvery rare not only in his times but also in the entire memory\nof things known \u2014whose armies in Spain rebelled against\nhim. This arose from nothing but his excessive mercy,\nwhich had allowed his soldiers more license than is fitting\nfor military discipline. Scipio\u2019s mercy was reproved in the\nSenate by Fabius Maximus, who called him the corruptor of\nthe Roman military. After the Locrians had been destroyed\nby a legate of Scipio\u2019s, they were not avenged by him, nor\nwas the insolence of that legate corrected \u2014all of which\narose from his agreeable nature, so that when someone in\nthe Senate wanted to excuse him, he said that there were\nmany men who knew better how not to err than how to\ncorrect errors. Such a nature would in time have sullied\nScipio\u2019s fame and glory if he had continued with it in the\nempire; but while he lived under the government of the\nSenate, this damaging quality of his not only was hidden,\nbut made for his glory.\n\nI conclude, then, returning to being feared and loved,\nthat since men love at their convenience and fear at the\nconvenience of the prince, a wise prince should found him-\nself on what is his, not on what is someone else\u2019s; he should\nonly contrive to avoid hatred, as was said.\n\n\nXVIII\n\nIn What Mode Faith Should Be\nKept by Princes\n\nHow praiseworthy it is for a prince to keep his faith, and to\nlive with honesty and not by astuteness, everyone under-\n"
,"stands. Nonetheless one sees by experience in our times that\nthe princes who have done great things are those who have\ntaken little account of faith and have known how to get\naround men\u2019s brains with their astuteness; and in the end\nthey have overcome those who have founded themselves\non loyalty.\n\nThus, you must know that there are two kinds of\ncombat: one with laws, the other with force. The first is\nproper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first is\noften not enough, one must have recourse to the second.\nTherefore it is necessary for a prince to know well how to\nuse the beast and the man. This role was taught covertly to\nprinces by ancient writers, who wrote that Achilles, and\nmany other ancient princes, were given to Chiron the cen-\ntaur to be raised, so that he would look after them with his\ndiscipline. To have as teacher a half-beast, half-man means\nnothing other than that a prince needs to know how to use\nboth natures; and the one without the other is not lasting.\n\nThus, since a prince is compelled of necessity to\nknow well how to use the beast, he should pick the fox\nand the lion, because the lion does not defend itself from\nsnares and the fox does not defend itself from wolves. So\none needs to be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to\nfrighten the wolves. Those who stay simply with the lion\ndo not understand this. A prudent lord, therefore, cannot\nobserve faith, nor should he, when such observance turns\nagainst him, and the causes that made him promise have\nbeen eliminated. And if all men were good, this teaching\nwould not be good; but because they are wicked and do\nnot observe faith with you, you also do not have to ob-\nserve it with them. Nor does a prince ever lack legitimate\ncauses to color his failure to observe faith. One could give\ninfinite modern examples of this, and show how many\npeace treaties and promises have been rendered invalid and\n"
,"vain through the infidelity of princes; and the one who has\nknown best how to use the fox has come out best. But it is\nnecessary to know well how to color this nature, and to be a\ngreat pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple and\nso obedient to present necessities that he who deceives will\nalways find someone who will let himself be deceived.\n\nI do not want to be silent about one of the recent\nexamples. Alexander VI never did anything, nor ever\nthought of anything, but how to deceive men, and he always\nfound a subject to whom he could do it. And there never\nwas a man with greater efficacy in asserting a thing, and\nin affirming it with greater oaths, who observed it less;\nnonetheless, his deceits succeeded at his will, because he\nwell knew this aspect of the world.\n\nThus, it is not necessary for a prince to have all the\nabove-mentioned qualities in fact, but it is indeed necessary\nto appear to have them. Nay, I dare say this, that by having\nthem and always observing them, they are harmful; and by\nappearing to have them, they are useful, as it is to appear\nmerciful, faithful, humane, honest, and religious, and to be\nso; but to remain with a spirit built so that, if you need not to\nbe those things, you are able and know how to change to the\ncontrary. This has to be understood: that a prince, and\nespecially a new prince, cannot observe all those things for\nwhich men are held good, since he is often under a necessity,\nto maintain his state, of acting against faith, against charity,\nagainst humanity, against religion. And so he needs to have a\nspirit disposed to change as the winds of fortune and varia-\ntions of things command him, and as I said above, not depart\nfrom good, when possible, but know how to enter into evil,\nwhen forced by necessity.\n\nA prince should thus take great care that nothing es-\ncape his mouth that is not full of the above-mentioned five\nqualities and that, to see him and hear him, he should appear\nall mercy, all faith, all honesty, all humanity, all religion.\nAnd nothing is more necessary to appear to have than this\n"
,"last quality. Men in general judge more by their eyes than\nby their hands, because seeing is given to everyone, touch-\ning to few. Everyone sees how you appear, few touch what\nyou are; and these few dare not oppose the opinion of many,\nwho have the majesty of the state to defend them; and in the\nactions of all men, and especially of princes, where there is\nno court to appeal to, one looks to the end. So let a prince\nwin and maintain his state: the means will always be judged\nhonorable, and will be praised by everyone. For the vulgar\nare taken in by the appearance and the outcome of a thing,\nand in the world there is no one but the vulgar; the few have\na place there when the many have somewhere to lean on. A\ncertain prince of present times, whom it is not well to\nname, never preaches anything but peace and faith, and is\nvery hostile to both. If he had observed both, he would\nhave had either his reputation or his state taken from him\nmany times.\n\n\nXIX\n\nOf Avoiding Contempt and\nHatred\n\nBut because I have spoken of the most important of the\nqualities mentioned above, I want to discourse on the others\nbriefly under this generality, that the prince, as was said\nabove in part, should think how to avoid those things that\n"
,"make him hateful and contemptible. When he avoids them,\nhe will have done his part and will find no danger in his\nother infamies. What makes him hated above all, as I said, is\nto be rapacious and a usurper of the property and the women\nof his subjects. From these he must abstain, and whenever\none does not take away either property or honor from the\ngenerality of men, they live content and one has only to\ncombat the ambition of the few which may be checked in\nmany modes and with ease. What makes him contemptible\nis to be held variable, light, effeminate, pusillanimous, irres-\nolute, from which a prince should guard himself as from a\nshoal. He should contrive that greatness, spiritedness, grav-\nity, and strength are recognized in his actions, and he should\ninsist that his judgments in the private concerns of his sub-\njects be irrevocable. And he should maintain such an\nopinion of himself that no one thinks either of deceiving\nhim or of getting around him.\n\nThe prince who gives this opinion of himself is highly\nreputed, and against whoever is reputed it is difficult to\nconspire, difficult to mount an attack, provided it is under-\nstood that he is excellent and revered by his own subjects.\nFor a prince should have two fears: one within, on account\nof his subjects; the other outside, on account of external\npowers. From the latter one is defended with good arms\nand good friends; and if one has good arms, one will always\nhave good friends. And things inside will always remain\nsteady, if things outside are steady, unless indeed they are\ndisturbed by a conspiracy; and even if things outside are in\nmotion, provided he has ordered and lived as I said, as long\nas he does not forsake himself he will always withstand\nevery thrust, as I said Nabis the Spartan did. But, as to\n"
,"subjects, when things outside are not moving, one has to\nfear that they may be conspiring secretly. From this the\nprince may secure himself sufficiently if he avoids being\nhated or despised and keeps the people satisfied with him;\nthis is necessary to achieve, as was said above at length.\n\nAnd one of the most powerful remedies that a prince has\nagainst conspiracies is not to be hated by the people gener-\nally. For whoever conspires always believes he will satisfy\nthe people with the death of the prince, but when he be-\nlieves he will offend them, he does not get up the spirit to\nadopt such a course, because the difficulties on the side of\nthe conspirators are infinite. And one sees from experience\nthat there have been many conspiracies, but few have had a\ngood end. For whoever conspires cannot be alone, but he\ncannot find company except from those he believes to be\nmalcontents; and as soon as you disclose your intent to a\nmalcontent, you give him the matter with which to become\ncontent, because manifestly he can hope for every advan-\ntage from it. So, seeing sure gain on this side, and on the\nother, dubious gain full of danger, he must indeed either be\na rare friend, or an altogether obstinate enemy of the prince,\nto observe his faith with you. And to reduce this to brief\nterms, I say that on the part of the conspirator there is\nnothing but fear, jealousy, and the anticipation of terrifying\npunishment; but on the part of the prince there is the maj-\nesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends\nand of the state which defend him, so that when popular\ngood will is added to all these things, it is impossible that\nanyone should be so rash as to conspire. For whereas a\nconspirator ordinarily has to fear before the execution of the\nevil, in this case (having the people as enemies) he must fear\nafterwards too, when the excess has occurred, nor can he\nhope for any refuge.\n"
,"One might give infinite examples of this matter, but I\nwish to be content with only one that happened within\nthe memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale Bentivoglio,\ngrandfather of the present Messer Annibale, who was\nprince in Bologna, was killed by the Canneschi conspiring\nagainst him, and no one survived him but Messer Giovanni,\nwho was in swaddling clothes. Immediately after that homi-\ncide the people rose up and killed all the Canneschi. This\ncame from the popular good will the house of Bentivoglio\nhad in those times, which was so great that since there\nremained no one of that house in Bologna who could rule\nthe state, Annibale being dead, and since there was indica-\ntion that in Florence someone had been born of the Ben-\ntivogli who was considered until then the son of a black-\nsmith, the Bolognese came to Florence for him and gave\nhim the government of their city, which was governed by\nhim until Messer Giovanni reached an age suitable for gov-\nerning.\n\nI conclude, therefore, that a prince should take little\naccount of conspiracies if the people show good will to him;\nbut if they are hostile and bear hatred for him, he should fear\neverything and everyone. And well-ordered states and wise\nprinces have thought out with all diligence how not to make\nthe great desperate and how to satisfy the people and keep\nthem content, because this is one of the most important\nmatters that concern a prince.\n\nAmong the well-ordered and governed kingdoms in\nour times is that of France; and in it are infinite good\ninstitutions on which the liberty and security of the king\ndepend. The first of these is the parlement and its authority.\nFor the one who ordered that kingdom, knowing the am-\n"
,"bition of the powerful and their insolence, and judging it\nnecessary for them to have a bit in their mouths to correct\nthem, and on the other side, knowing the hatred of the\ngenerality of people against the great, which is founded in\nits fear, and wanting to secure them, intended this not to be\nthe particular concern of the king, so as to take from him the\nblame he would have from the great when he favored the\npopular side, and from the popular side when he favored the\ngreat; and so he constituted a third judge to be the one who\nwould beat down the great and favor the lesser side without\nblame for the king. This order could not be better, or more\nprudent, or a greater cause of the security of the king and\nthe kingdom. From this one can infer another notable thing:\nthat princes should have anything blameable administered\nby others, favors by themselves. Again I conclude that a\nprince should esteem the great, but not make himself hated\nby the people.\n\nIt might perhaps appear to many, considering the life\nand death of some Roman emperor, that there were ex-\namples contrary to my opinion, since one may find some-\none who has always lived excellently, and shown great vir-\ntue of spirit, and has nonetheless lost the empire or indeed\nbeen killed by his own subjects who conspired against him.\nSince I want, therefore, to respond to these objections,\nI shall discuss the qualities of certain emperors, showing\nthe causes of their ruin to be not unlike that which I\nhave advanced; and in part I shall offer for consideration\nthings that are notable for whoever reads about the actions\nof those times. And I want it to suffice for me to take all the\nemperors who succeeded to the empire, from Marcus the\nphilosopher to Maximinus: these were Marcus, Commodus\nhis son, Pertinax, Julianus, Severus, his son Antoninus\nCaracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Max-\n"
,"iminus. And first it is to be noted that whereas in other\nprincipalities one has to contend only with the ambition\nof the great and the insolence of the people, the Roman\nemperors had a third difficulty, of having to bear with the\ncruelty and avarice of their soldiers. This was so difficult that\nit was the cause of the ruin of many, since it was difficult to\nsatisfy the soldiers and the people. For the people loved\nquiet, and therefore loved modest princes, and the soldiers\nloved a prince with a military spirit who was insolent, cruel,\nand rapacious. They wanted him to practice these things\non the people so that they could double their pay and\ngive vent to their avarice and cruelty. These things always\nbrought about the ruin of those emperors who by nature or\nby art did not have a great reputation such that they could\nhold both in check. And most of them, especially those who\ncame to the principate as new men, once they recognized\nthe difficulty of these two diverse humors, turned to sat-\nisfying the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people.\nThis course was necessary; for since princes cannot fail to\nbe hated by someone, they are at first forced not to be hated\nby the people generally; and when they cannot continue\nthis, they have to contrive with all industry to avoid the\nhatred of those communities which are most powerful.\nAnd so those emperors who because they were new had\nneed of extraordinary support stuck to the soldiers rather\nthan the people, which nonetheless turned out useful for\nthem or not according to whether that prince knew how to\nkeep himself in repute with them. From the causes men-\ntioned above, Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, all living a\nmodest life, lovers of justice, enemies of cruelty, humane\n"
,"and kind, all, except for Marcus, came to a bad end. Only\nMarcus lived and died most honorably, because he suc-\nceeded to the empire by hereditary right and did not have to\nacknowledge it as from either the soldiers or the people;\nthen, since he was attended with many virtues that made\nhim venerable, while he lived he always kept the one order\nand the other within its bounds, and was never either hated\nor despised. But Pertinax was created emperor against the\nwill of the soldiers, who, since they were used to living in\nlicense under Commodus, could not tolerate the decent life\nto which Pertinax wanted to return them; hence, having\ncreated hatred for himself, and to this hatred added disdain\nsince he was old, he was ruined in the first beginnings of his\nadministration.\n\nAnd here one should note that hatred is acquired\nthrough good deeds as well as bad ones; and so, as I said\nabove, a prince who wants to maintain his state is often\nforced not to be good. For when that community of which\nyou judge you have need to maintain yourself is corrupt,\nwhether they are the people or the soldiers or the great, you\nmust follow their humor to satisfy them, and then good\ndeeds are your enemy. But let us come to Alexander. He was\nof such goodness that among the other praise attributed to\nhim is this: that in the fourteen years he held the em-\npire no one was ever put to death by him without a trial.\nNonetheless, since he was held to be effeminate and a man\nwho let himself be governed by his mother, and for this\ncame to be despised, the army conspired against him and\nkilled him.\n\nReviewing now, by contrast, the qualities of Com-\nmodus, of Severus, Antoninus Caracalla, and Max-\n"
,"iminus, you will find them very cruel and very rapacious.\nTo satisfy the soldiers, they would not spare any kind of\ninjury that could be inflicted on the people; and all except\nSeverus came to a bad end. For in Severus was so much\nvirtue that, by keeping the soldiers his friends, although the\npeople were overburdened by him, he was always able to\nrule happily because his virtues made him so admirable in\nthe sight of the soldiers and the people that the latter re-\nmained somehow astonished and stupefied, while the\nformer were reverent and satisfied.\n\nAnd because the actions of this man were great and\nnotable in a new prince, I want to show briefly how well he\nknew how to use the persons of the fox and the lion, whose\nnatures I say above are necessary for a prince to imitate.\nSince Severus knew of the indolence of Emperor Julianus,\nhe persuaded his army, of which he was captain in Slavonia,\nthat it would be good to go to Rome and avenge the death\nof Pertinax, who had been put to death by the praetorian\nsoldiers. Under this pretext, without showing that he aspired\nto the empire, he moved his army against Rome; and he was\nin Italy before his departure was known. When he arrived at\nRome, he was elected emperor by the Senate out of fear and\nJulianus put to death. After this beginning there remained\ntwo difficulties for Severus if he wanted to become lord of\nthe whole state: one in Asia, where Pescennius Niger, the\nhead of the Asian armies, had had himself called emperor;\nand the other in the West, where Albinus also aspired to the\nempire. And because he judged it dangerous to disclose\nhimself as an enemy to both, he decided to attack Niger\nand deceive Albinus. To Albinus he wrote that since he had\nbeen elected emperor by the Senate he wanted to share that\ndignity with him; he sent him the title of Caesar, and by\ndecision of the Senate accepted him as colleague. These\n"
,"things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus\nhad defeated Niger, put him to death, and brought peace to\naffairs in the East, he returned to Rome and complained in\nthe Senate that Albinus, hardly grateful for the benefits he\nhad received from him, had perfidiously sought to kill him,\nand for this it was necessary for Severus to go punish his\ningratitude. Then he went to meet him in France, and took\nfrom him his state and his life.\n\nThus, whoever examines minutely the actions of this\nman will find him a very fierce lion and a very astute fox,\nwill see that he was feared and revered by everyone, and not\nhated by the army, and will not marvel that he, a new\nman, could have held so much power. For his very great\nreputation always defended him from the hatred that the\npeople could have conceived for him because of his robber-\nies. But his son Antoninus [Caracalla] was himself a man\nwho had most excellent parts that made him marvelous in\nthe sight of the people and pleasing to the soldiers. For he\nwas a military man, very capable of enduring every trouble,\ndisdainful of all delicate food and of all other softness, which\nmade him loved by all the armies. Nonetheless, his ferocity\nand cruelty were so great and so unheard of \u2014for after\ninfinite individual killings he had put to death a great part of\nthe people of Rome and all the people of Alexandria \u2014that\nhe became most hateful to all the world. He began to be\nfeared even by those whom he had around him, so that he\nwas killed by a centurion in the midst of his army. Here it is\nto be noted that deaths such as these, which follow from the\ndecision of an obstinate spirit, cannot be avoided by princes\nbecause anyone who does not care about death can hurt\nhim; but the prince may well fear them less because they are\nvery rare. He should only guard against doing grave injury\nto anyone of those whom he uses and has around him in the\n"
,"service of his principality, as Antoninus had done. He had\nput to death with disgrace a brother of that centurion, and\nthreatened him every day; yet he kept him in his bodyguard,\nwhich was a rash policy likely to bring ruin, as happened\nto him.\n\nBut let us come to Commodus, who held the empire\nwith great ease because he had it by hereditary right, being\nthe son of Marcus. It was enough for him only to follow in\nthe footsteps of his father, and he would have satisfied both\nthe soldiers and the people. But since he had a cruel and\nbestial spirit, so as to practice his rapacity on the people he\nturned to indulging the armies and making them licentious.\nOn the other hand, by not keeping his dignity, by descend-\ning often into theaters to fight with gladiators, and by doing\nother very base things hardly deserving of the imperial maj-\nesty, he became contemptible in the sight of the soldiers.\nAnd since he was hated on one side and despised on the\nother, he was conspired against and put to death.\n\nIt remains now to tell of the qualities of Maximinus.\nHe was a very warlike man; and since the armies were\ndisgusted with the softness of Alexander, whom I discussed\nabove, when he was put to death they elected Maximinus to\nthe empire. He did not possess it for long because two things\nmade him hated and contemptible: one was being of very\nbase origin because he had formerly herded sheep in\nThrace (which was very well known everywhere and\nbrought great disdain for him in the sight of everyone); the\nother was that because at the start of his principality he had\ndeferred going to Rome and taking possession of the impe-\nrial throne, he had established an opinion of himself as very\n"
,"cruel, since he had committed many cruelties through his\nprefects in Rome and everywhere in the empire. So, since\nthe whole world was excited by indignation at the baseness\nof his blood and by hatred arising from fear of his ferocity,\nAfrica rebelled first, then the Senate with all the people of\nRome; and all Italy conspired against him. These were\njoined by his own army, which, while besieging Aquileia\nand finding difficulty in capturing it, became disgusted with\nthis cruelty, and fearing him less because it saw he had so\nmany enemies, it killed him.\n\nI do not want to reason about either Heliogabalus or\nMacrinus or Julianus, who, because they were altogether\ncontemptible, were immediately eliminated; but I shall\ncome to the conclusion of this discourse. And I say that the\nprinces of our times have less of this difficulty of satisfying\nthe soldiers by extraordinary means in their governments.\nFor notwithstanding that one has to show them some con-\nsideration, yet this is quickly settled because none of these\nprinces has armies joined together which are entrenched in\nthe government and administration of provinces, as were\nthe armies of the Roman Empire. And so, if at that time it\nwas necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it\nwas because the soldiers could do more than the people.\nNow it is necessary for all princes except the Turk and the\nSultan to satisfy the people rather than the soldiers, because\nthe people can do more than the soldiers. I except the\nTurk from this, since he always keeps around him twelve\nthousand infantry and fifteen thousand horse on whom\nthe security and strength of his kingdom depend; and it is\nnecessary for that lord to put off every other regard and\n"
,"keep them his friends. Similarly, since the kingdom of the\nsultan is in the hands of the soldiers, he also is required to\nkeep them his friends, without respect for the people. And\nyou have to note that the sultan\u2019s state is formed unlike all\nother principalities because it is similar to the Christian\npontificate, which cannot be called either a hereditary prin-\ncipality or a new principality. For it is not the sons of the old\nprince who are the heirs and become the lords, but the one\nwho is elected to that rank by those who have the authority\nfor it. And this being an ancient order, one cannot call it a\nnew principality, because some of the difficulties in new\nprincipalities are not in it; for if the prince is indeed new, the\norders of that state are old and are ordered to receive him as\nif he were their hereditary lord.\n\nBut let us return to our matter. I say that whoever\nconsiders the discourse written above will see that either\nhatred or disdain has been the cause of the ruin of the\nemperors named before, and will also know whence it arises\nthat, though some of them proceeded in one mode and\nsome in the contrary mode, in whichever mode, one of\nthem came to a happy end and the others to unhappy ends.\nFor to Pertinax and Alexander, because they were new\nprinces, it was useless and harmful to wish to imitate Mar-\ncus, who was in the principate by hereditary right; and\nsimilarly, for Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus it was a\npernicious thing to imitate Severus, because they did not\nhave as much virtue as would allow them to follow in his\nfootsteps. Therefore, a new prince in a new principality\ncannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor again is it neces-\nsary to follow those of Severus; but he should take from\nSeverus those parts which are necessary to found his state\nand from Marcus those which are fitting and glorious to\nconserve a state that is already established and firm.\n"
,"XX\n\nWhether Fortresses and Many\nOther Things Which Are Made\nand Done by Princes Every Day\nAre Useful or Useless\n\nSome princes have disarmed their subjects so as to hold their\nstates securely; some others have kept their subject towns\ndivided; some have nourished enmities against themselves;\nsome others have turned to gaining to themselves those who\nhad been suspect to them at the beginning of their states;\nsome have built fortresses; some have knocked them down\nand destroyed them. And although one cannot give a defi-\nnite judgment on all these things unless one comes to the\nparticulars of those states where any such decision has to be\nmade, nonetheless I shall speak in that broad mode which\nthe matter permits in itself.\n\nThere has never been, then, a new prince who has\ndisarmed his subjects; on the contrary, whenever he has\nfound them unarmed, he has always armed them. For when\nthey are armed, those arms become yours; those whom\nyou suspected become faithful, and those who were faithful\nremain so; and from subjects they are made into your parti-\nsans. And because all subjects cannot be armed, if those\nwhom you arm are benefited, one can act with more se-\ncurity toward the others. The difference of treatment that\nthey recognize regarding themselves makes them obligated\nto you; the others excuse you, judging it necessary that\nthose who have more danger and more obligation deserve\nmore. But, when you disarm them, you begin to offend\nthem; you show that you distrust them either for cowardice\nor for lack of faith, both of which opinions generate hatred\n"
,"against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, you\nmust turn to a mercenary military, which is of the quality\ndescribed above; and even if it were good, it cannot be so\ngood as to defend you against powerful enemies and suspect\nsubjects. So, as I said, a new prince of a new principality\nalways has ordered the arms there. The histories are full of\nexamples of this.\n\nBut when a prince acquires a new state that is added as\na member to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm that\nstate, except for those who were your partisans in acquiring\nit. These, too, it is necessary to render soft and effeminate,\nin time and with opportunity, and to be ordered so that the\narms of all your state are only with your own soldiers, who\nlive next to you in your old state.\n\nOur ancients, and those who were esteemed wise, used\nto say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia with parties and\nPisa with fortresses; and because of this they nourished\ndifferences in some towns subject to them, so as to hold\nthem more easily. In times when Italy was in balance in a\ncertain mode, this would have been good to do, but I do not\nbelieve that one could give it today as a teaching. For I do\nnot believe that divisions ever do any good; on the contrary,\nwhen the enemy approaches, of necessity divided cities are\nimmediately lost, because the weaker party always joins the\nexternal forces and the other will not be able to rule.\n\nThe Venetians, moved as I believe by the reasons writ-\nten above, nourished the Guelf and Ghibelline sects in the\ncities subject to them. Although the Venetians never let\nthem come to blood, still they nourished these contentions\namong them, so that occupied as those citizens were with\ntheir differences, they did not unite against the Venetians.\nAs may be seen, this did not turn out according to their plan\nlater, because when they were defeated at Vail\u00e0, one party\nimmediately became daring, and took all of their state from\n"
,"them. Such modes, therefore, imply weakness in the prince.\nFor in a vigorous principality such divisions are never per-\nmitted, because they bring profit only in time of peace,\nas subjects can be managed more easily through them;\nbut when war comes, such an order shows its own falla-\nciousness.\n\nWithout doubt princes become great when they over-\ncome difficulties made for them and opposition made to\nthem. So fortune, especially when she wants to make a new\nprince great \u2014since he has a greater necessity to acquire\nreputation than a hereditary prince\u2014 makes enemies arise\nfor him and makes them undertake enterprises against him,\nso that he has cause to overcome them and to climb higher\non the ladder that his enemies have brought for him. There-\nfore many judge that a wise prince, when he has the op-\nportunity for it, should astutely nourish some enmity so that\nwhen he has crushed it, his greatness emerges the more\nfrom it.\n\nPrinces, and especially those that are new, have found\nmore faith and more utility in those men who at the begin-\nning of their states were held to be suspect than in those\nwhom they trusted at the beginning. Pandolfo Petrucci,\nprince of Siena, ruled his state more with those who had\nbeen suspect to him than with the others. But one cannot\nspeak broadly of this thing because it varies according to the\nsubject. I will only say this, that the prince will always be\nable to win over to himself with the greatest ease those men\nwho in the beginning of a principality had been enemies,\nand who are of such quality that to maintain themselves they\nneed somewhere to lean. They are all the more forced to\nserve him faithfully as they know it is more necessary for\nthem to cancel out with deeds the sinister opinion one has\ntaken of them. And so the prince always extracts more use\nfrom them than from those who, while serving him with\ntoo much security, neglect his affairs.\n\nAnd since the matter requires it, I do not want to leave\n"
,"out a reminder to princes who have newly taken a state\nthrough internal support within it, that they consider well\nwhat cause moved those who supported them to support\nthem. If it is not natural affection toward them but only\nbecause those supporters were not content with that state,\nhe will be able to keep them his friends with trouble and\ngreat difficulty, because it is impossible for him to make\nthem content. And while reviewing well the cause of this,\nwith examples drawn from ancient and modern things, he\nwill see that it is much easier to gain as friends to himself men\nwho were content with the state beforehand, and therefore\nwere his enemies, than those who, because they were not\ncontent with it, became friends and gave him support in\nseizing it.\n\nIt has been the custom of princes, so as to be able\nto hold their states more securely, to build fortresses that\nwould be a bridle and bit for those who might plan to act\nagainst them, and to have a secure refuge from sudden\nattack. I praise this mode because it has been used since\nantiquity. Nonetheless, in our times Messer Niccol\u00f2 Vitelli\nwas seen to destroy two fortresses in Citt\u00e0 di Castello in\norder to hold that state. When Guidobaldo, duke of Ur-\nbino, returned to his dominion from which Cesare Borgia\nhad expelled him, he razed all the fortresses in that province\nto their foundations; and he judged that without them he\nwould with greater difficulty lose his state again. When\nthe Bentivogli returned to Bologna, they adopted similar\nmeasures. Fortresses are thus useful or not according to the\ntimes, and if they do well for you in one regard, they hurt\nyou in another. And one may discuss this issue thus. The\nprince who has more fear of the people than of foreigners\nought to make fortresses, but the one who has more fear of\n"
,"foreigners than of the people, ought to omit them. The\ncastle in Milan built by Francesco Sforza has brought and\nwill bring more war to the Sforza house than any other\ndisorder of that state. Therefore the best fortress there is, is\nnot to be hated by the people, because although you may\nhave fortresses, if the people hold you in hatred fortresses do\nnot save you; for to peoples who have taken up arms for-\neigners will never be lacking to come to their aid. In our\ntimes fortresses have not been seen to bring profit to any\nprince, unless to the Countess of Forl\u00ec, when Count Giro-\nlamo, her consort, died; for by means of a fortress she was\nable to escape a popular uprising, to await help from Milan,\nand to recover her state. And the times then were such that\na foreigner could not help the people. But later, fortresses\nwere worth little to her when Cesare Borgia attacked her,\nand her hostile people joined with the foreigner. Therefore,\nthen and before it would have been more secure for her not\nto be hated by the people than to have had fortresses. So,\nhaving considered all these things, I shall praise whoever\nmakes fortresses and whoever does not, and I shall blame\nanyone who, trusting in fortresses, thinks little of being\nhated by the people.\n\n\nXXI\n\nWhat a Prince Should Do to Be\nHeld in Esteem\n\nNothing makes a prince so much esteemed as to carry on\ngreat enterprises and to give rare examples of himself. In\n"
,"our times we have Ferdinand of Aragon, the present king of\nSpain. This man can be called an almost new prince because\nfrom being a weak king he has become by fame and by glory\nthe first king among the Christians; and, if you consider his\nactions, you will find them all very great and some of them\nextraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he attacked\nGranada, and that enterprise was the foundation of his state.\nFirst, he made it at leisure and without fear of being inter-\nfered with; he kept the minds of the barons of Castile\npreoccupied; while thinking of that war, they did not think\nof innovating. And in the meantime he acquired reputation\nand power over them which they did not perceive. He was\nable to sustain armies with money from the Church and the\npeople, and with that long war to lay a foundation for his\nown military, which later brought him honor. Besides this,\nin order to undertake greater enterprises, always making use\nof religion, he turned to an act of pious cruelty, expelling the\nMarranos from his kingdom and despoiling it of them; nor\ncould there be an example more wretched and rarer than\nthis. He attacked Africa under this same cloak, made his\ncampaign in Italy, and has lately attacked France; and so he\nhas always done and ordered great things, which have always\nkept the minds of his subjects in suspense and admiration,\nand occupied with their outcome. And his actions have\nfollowed upon one another in such a mode that he has never\nallowed an interval between them for men to be able to\nwork quietly against him.\n\nIt also helps very much for a prince to give rare exam-\nples of himself in governing internally, similar to those that\n"
,"are told of Messer Bernab\u00f2 da Milano, when the oppor-\ntunity arises of someone who works for something extraor-\ndinary in civil life, either for good or for ill, and of picking a\nmode of rewarding or punishing him of which much will be\nsaid. And above all a prince should contrive to give himself\nthe fame of a great man and of an excellent talent in every\naction of his.\n\nA prince is also esteemed when he is a true friend and a\ntrue enemy, that is, when without any hesitation he dis-\ncloses himself in support of someone against another. This\ncourse is always more useful than to remain neutral, because\nif two powers close to you come to grips, either they are of\nsuch quality that if one wins, you have to fear the winner, or\nnot. In either of these two cases, it will always be more\nuseful to you to disclose yourself and to wage open war; for\nin the first case if you do not disclose yourself, you will\nalways be the prey of whoever wins, to the pleasure and\nsatisfaction of the one who was defeated, and you have no\nreason, nor anything, to defend you or give you refuge. For\nwhoever wins does not want suspect friends who may not\nhelp him in adversity; whoever loses does not give you\nrefuge, since you did not want to share his fortune with arms\nin hand.\n\nAntiochus came into Greece, summoned there by the\nAetolians to expel the Romans from it. Antiochus sent\nspokesmen to the Achaeans, who were friends of the Ro-\nmans, to urge them to remain in the middle; and on the\nother side, the Romans sought to persuade them to take up\narms for them. This matter came up for decision in the\ncouncil of the Achaeans, where the legate from Antiochus\nwas persuading them to remain neutral, to which the Ro-\nman legate responded: \u201cAs to what they say, moreover,\n"
,"that you should not intervene in the war, nothing is more\nalien to your interests; without thanks, without dignity you\nwill be the prize of the victor.\u201d\n\nAnd it will always happen that the one who is not\nfriendly will seek your neutrality, and he who is friendly\nto you will ask that you declare yourself with arms. And\nirresolute princes, in order to escape present dangers, follow\nthat neutral way most times, and most times come to ruin.\nBut, when the prince discloses himself boldly in support of\none side, if the one to whom you adhere wins, although he\nis powerful and you remain at his discretion, he has an\nobligation to you and has a contract of love for you; and men\nare never so indecent as to crush you with so great an ex-\nample of ingratitude. Then, too, victories are never so clear\nthat the winner does not have to have some respect, espe-\ncially for justice. But if the one to whom you adhere loses,\nyou are given refuge by him; and he helps you while he can,\nand you become the companion of a fortune that can revive.\nIn the second case, when those who fight together are of\nsuch quality that you do not have to fear the one who wins,\nso much the greater is the prudence of joining sides; for you\nassist in the ruin of one with the aid of the other who ought\nto save him, if he were wise; and when he has won, he\nremains at your discretion; and with your aid it is impossible\nthat he not win.\n\nAnd here it is to be noted that a prince must beware\nnever to associate with someone more powerful than him-\nself so as to attack others, except when necessity presses, as\nwas said above. For when you win, you are left his prisoner,\nand princes should avoid as much as they can being at the\ndiscretion of others. The Venetians accompanied France\nagainst the duke of Milan, and they could have avoided\nbeing in that company \u2014from which their ruin resulted.\n"
,"But when one cannot avoid it (as happened to the Floren-\ntines when the pope and Spain went with their armies to\nattack Lombardy), then the prince should join for the rea-\nsons given above. Nor should any state ever believe that it\ncan always adopt safe courses; on the contrary, it should\nthink it has to take them all as doubtful. For in the order\nof things it is found that one never seeks to avoid one\ninconvenience without running into another; but prudence\nconsists in knowing how to recognize the qualities of incon-\nveniences, and in picking the less bad as good.\n\nA prince should also show himself a lover of the virtues,\ngiving recognition to virtuous men, and he should honor\nthose who are excellent in an art. Next, he should inspire\nhis citizens to follow their pursuits quietly, in trade and in\nagriculture and in every other pursuit of men, so that one\nperson does not fear to adorn his possessions for fear that\nthey be taken away from him, and another to open up a\ntrade for fear of taxes. But he should prepare rewards for\nwhoever wants to do these things, and for anyone who\nthinks up any way of expanding his city or his state. Besides\nthis, he should at suitable times of the year keep the people\noccupied with festivals and spectacles. And because every\ncity is divided into guilds or into clans, he should take\naccount of those communities, meet with them some-\ntimes, and make himself an example of humanity and\nmunificence, always holding firm the majesty of his dignity\nnonetheless, because he can never want this to be lacking\nin anything.\n"
,"XXII\n\nOf Those Whom Princes Have as\nSecretaries\n\nThe choice of ministers is of no small importance to a\nprince; they are good or not according to the prudence\nof the prince. And the first conjecture that is to be made of\nthe brain of a lord is to see the men he has around him;\nand when they are capable and faithful, he can always be re-\nputed wise because he has known how to recognize them as\ncapable and to maintain them as faithful. But if they are\notherwise, one can always pass unfavorable judgment on\nhim, because the first error he makes, he makes in this\nchoice.\n\nThere was no one who knew Messer Antonio da Ve-\nnafro as minister of Pandolfo Petrucci, prince of Siena,\nwho did not judge Pandolfo to be a most worthy man, since\nhe had Antonio as his minister. And since there are three\nkinds of brains: one that understands by itself, another that\ndiscerns what others understand, the third that understands\nneither by itself nor through others; the first is most excel-\nlent, the second excellent, and the third useless \u2014it follows,\ntherefore, of necessity that, if Pandolfo was not in the first\nrank, he was in the second. For every time that one has the\njudgment to recognize the good or evil that someone does\nor says, although he does not have the inventiveness by\nhimself, he knows the bad deeds and the good of his minister\nand extols the one and corrects the other; and the minister\ncannot hope to deceive him and remains good himself.\n"
,"But as to how a prince can know his minister, here is a\nmode that never fails. When you see a minister thinking\nmore of himself than of you, and in all actions looking for\nsomething useful to himself, one so made will never be a\ngood minister; never will you be able to trust him, because\nhe who has someone\u2019s state in his hands should never think\nof himself but always of the prince, and he should never\nremember anything that does not pertain to the prince. And\non the other side, the prince should think of the minister so\nas to keep him good \u2014honoring him, making him rich,\nobligating him to himself, sharing honors and burdens with\nhim so that he sees he cannot stand without the prince and\nso that many honors do not make him desire more honors,\nmuch wealth does not make him desire more wealth, and\nmany burdens make him fear changes. When, therefore,\nministers and princes in relation to ministers are so consti-\ntuted, they can trust one another; when it is otherwise, the\nend is always damaging either for one or the other.\n\n\nXXIII\n\nIn What Mode Flatterers Are to Be\nAvoided\n\nI do not want to leave out an important point and an error\nfrom which princes defend themselves with difficulty, un-\nless they are very prudent or make good choices. And these\nare the flatterers of whom courts are full; for men take such\npleasure in their own affairs and so deceive themselves there\nthat they defend themselves with difficulty from this\nplague, and in trying to defend oneself from it one risks the\ndanger of becoming contemptible. For there is no other\nway to guard oneself from flattery unless men understand\n"
,"that they do not offend you in telling you the truth; but\nwhen everyone can tell you the truth, they lack reverence\nfor you. Therefore, a prudent prince must hold to a third\nmode, choosing wise men in his state; and only to these\nshould he give freedom to speak the truth to him, and of\nthose things only that he asks about and nothing else. But\nhe should ask them about everything and listen to their\nopinions; then he should decide by himself, in his own\nmode; and with these councils and with each member of\nthem he should behave in such a mode that everyone knows\nthat the more freely he speaks, the more he will be accepted.\nAside from these, he should not want to hear anyone; he\nshould move directly to the thing that was decided and be\nobstinate in his decisions. Whoever does otherwise either\nfalls headlong because of flatterers or changes often because\nof the variability of views, from which a low estimation of\nhim arises.\n\nI want to bring up a modern example in this regard.\nFather Luca, a man of the present emperor Maximilian,\nspeaking of his majesty, told how he did not take counsel\nfrom anyone and never did anything in his own mode; this\narose from holding to a policy contrary to that given above.\nFor the emperor is a secretive man who does not communi-\ncate his plans to anyone, nor seek their views; but as in\nputting them into effect they begin to be known and dis-\nclosed, they begin to be contradicted by those whom he has\naround him, and he, an agreeable person, is dissuaded from\nthem. From this it arises that the things he does on one day\nhe destroys on another, that no one ever understands what\n"
,"he wants or plans to do, and that one cannot found oneself\non his decisions.\n\nA prince, therefore, should always take counsel, but\nwhen he wants, and not when others want it; on the con-\ntrary, he should discourage everyone from counseling him\nabout anything unless he asks it of them. But he should be a\nvery broad questioner, and then, in regard to the things he\nasked about, a patient listener to the truth; indeed, he should\nbecome upset when he learns that anyone has any hesitation\nto speak it to him. And since many esteem that any prince\nwho establishes an opinion of himself as prudent is so con-\nsidered not because of his nature but because of the good\ncounsel he has around him, without doubt they are de-\nceived. For this is a general rule that never fails: that a prince\nwho is not wise by himself cannot be counseled well, unless\nindeed by chance he should submit himself to one alone to\ngovern him in everything, who is a very prudent man. In\nthis case he could well be, but it would not last long because\nthat governor would in a short time take away his state. But\nby taking counsel from more than one, a prince who is not\nwise will never have united counsel, nor know by himself\nhow to unite them. Each one of his counselors will think of\nhis own interest; he will not know how to correct them or\nunderstand them. And they cannot be found otherwise,\nbecause men will always turn out bad for you unless they\nhave been made good by a necessity. So one concludes that\ngood counsel, from wherever it comes, must arise from the\nprudence of the prince, and not the prudence of the prince\nfrom good counsel.\n"
,"XXIV\n\nWhy the Princes of Italy Have Lost\nTheir States\n\nWhen the things written above have been observed pru-\ndently, they make a new prince appear ancient and im-\nmediately render him more secure and steady in his state\nthan if he had grown old in it. For a new prince is observed\nmuch more in his actions than a hereditary one; and when\nthey are recognized as virtuous, they take hold of men much\nmore and obligate them much more than ancient blood.\nFor men are much more taken by present things than by past\nones, and when they find good in the present, they enjoy it\nand do not seek elsewhere; indeed they will take up every\ndefense on behalf of a new prince if he is not lacking in other\nthings as regards himself. And so he will have the double\nglory of having made the beginning of a new principality, of\nhaving adorned it and consolidated it with good laws, good\narms, good friends, and good examples, just as he has a\ndouble shame who, having been born prince, has lost it\nthrough his lack of prudence.\n\nAnd if one considers those lords in Italy who have lost\ntheir states in our times, like the king of Naples, the duke of\nMilan, and others, one will find in them, first, a common\ndefect as to arms, the causes of which have been discussed at\nlength above; then, one will see that some of them either\nhad a hostile people or if they had friendly peoples, did not\nknow how to secure themselves against the great. For with-\nout these defects, states that have enough nerve to put an\n"
,"army into the field are not lost. Philip of Macedon, not the\nfather of Alexander but the one who was defeated by Titus\nQuintius, did not have much of a state with respect to the\ngreatness of the Romans and of Greece, who attacked him;\nnonetheless, because he was a military man and knew how\nto deal with the people and secure himself against the great,\nhe kept up a war against them for many years; and if at\nthe end he lost dominion over several cities, his kingdom\nremained to him nonetheless.\n\nTherefore, these princes of ours who have been in\ntheir principalities for many years may not accuse fortune\nwhen they have lost them afterwards, but their own indo-\nlence; for, never having thought that quiet times could\nchange (which is a common defect of men, not to take\naccount of the storm during the calm), when later the times\nbecame adverse, they thought of fleeing and not of de-\nfending themselves. And they hoped that their peoples,\ndisgusted with the insolence of the victors, would call them\nback. This course is good when others are lacking; but it is\nindeed bad to have put aside other remedies for this one. For\none should never fall in the belief you can find someone to\npick you up. Whether it does not happen or happens, it is\nnot security for you, because that defense was base and did\nnot depend on you. And those defenses alone are good, are\ncertain, and are lasting, that depend on you yourself and on\nyour virtue.\n"
,"XXV\n\nHow Much Fortune Can Do in\nHuman Affairs, and in What Mode\nIt May Be Opposed\n\nIt is not unknown to me that many have held and hold the\nopinion that worldly things are so governed by fortune and\nby God, that men cannot correct them with their prudence,\nindeed that they have no remedy at all; and on account of\nthis they might judge that one need not sweat much over\nthings but let oneself be governed by chance. This opinion\nhas been believed more in our times because of the great\nvariability of things which have been seen and are seen\nevery day, beyond every human conjecture. When I have\nthought about this sometimes, I have been in some part\ninclined to their opinion. Nonetheless, so that our free will\nnot be eliminated, I judge that it might be true that fortune\nis arbiter of half of our actions, but also that she leaves the\nother half, or close to it, for us to govern. And I liken her\nto one of these violent rivers which, when they become\nenraged, flood the plains, ruin the trees and the buildings, lift\nearth from this part, drop in another; each person flees before\nthem, everyone yields to their impetus without being able\nto hinder them in any regard. And although they are like\nthis, it is not as if men, when times are quiet, could not\nprovide for them with dikes and dams so that when they rise\nlater, either they go by a canal or their impetus is neither\nso wanton nor so damaging. It happens similarly with\nfortune, which demonstrates her power where virtue\nhas not been put in order to resist her and therefore\nturns her impetus where she knows that dams and dikes\n"
,"have not been made to contain her. And if you consider\nItaly, which is the seat of these variations and that which has\ngiven them motion, you will see a country without dams\nand without any dike. If it had been diked by suitable virtue,\nlike Germany, Spain, and France, either this flood would\nnot have brought the great variations that it has, or it would\nnot have come here.\n\nAnd I wish that this may be enough to have said about\nopposing fortune in general. But restricting myself more to\nparticulars, I say that one sees a given prince be happy\ntoday and come to ruin tomorrow without having seen him\nchange his nature or any quality. This I believe arises, first,\nfrom the causes that have been discussed at length in the\npreceding, that is, that the prince who leans entirely on his\nfortune comes to ruin as it varies. I believe, further, that he is\nhappy who adapts his mode of proceeding to the qualities of\nthe times; and similarly, he is unhappy whose procedure is in\ndisaccord with the times. For one sees that in the things that\nlead men to the end that each has before him, that is, glories\nand riches, they proceed variously: one with caution, the\nother with impetuosity; one by violence, the other with\nart; one with patience, the other with its contrary \u2014and\nwith these different modes each can attain it. One also sees\ntwo cautious persons, one attaining his plan, the other\nnot; and similarly two persons are equally happy with two\ndifferent methods, one being cautious, the other impetu-\nous. This arises from nothing other than from the quality of\nthe times that they conform to or not in their procedure.\nFrom this follows what I said, that two persons working\ndifferently come out with the same effect; and of two\npersons working identically, one is led to his end, the\n"
,"other not. On this also depends the variability of the good:\nfor if one governs himself with caution and patience, and the\ntimes and affairs turn in such a way that his government\nis good, he comes out happy; but if the times and affairs\nchange, he is ruined because he does not change his mode of\nproceeding. Nor may a man be found so prudent as to know\nhow to accommodate himself to this, whether because he\ncannot deviate from what nature inclines him to or also\nbecause, when one has always flourished by walking on one\npath, he cannot be persuaded to depart from it. And so the\ncautious man, when it is time to come to impetuosity, does\nnot know how to do it, hence comes to ruin: for if he would\nchange his nature with the times and with affairs, his fortune\nwould not change.\n\nPope Julius II proceeded impetuously in all his affairs,\nand he found the times and affairs so much in conformity\nwith his mode of proceeding that he always achieved a\nhappy end. Consider the first enterprise that he undertook\nin Bologna, while Messer Giovanni Bentivoglio was still\nliving. The Venetians were not content with it; nor was the\nking of Spain; with France he was holding discussions on\nthat enterprise; and nonetheless, with his ferocity and im-\npetuosity, he personally put that expedition into motion.\nThis move made Spain and the Venetians stand still in sus-\npense, the latter out of fear and the other because of the\ndesire he had to recover the whole kingdom of Naples.\nFrom the other side he pulled the king of France after him;\nbecause when that king saw him move, and since he desired\nto make Julius his friend in order to bring down the Vene-\ntians, he judged he could not deny him his troops without\ninjuring him openly. Julius thus accomplished with his im-\npetuous move what no other pontiff, with all human pru-\ndence, would ever have accomplished, because if he had\n"
,"waited to depart from Rome with firm conclusions and\neverything in order, as any other pontiff would have done,\nhe would never have succeeded. For the king of France\nwould have had a thousand excuses and the others would\nhave raised in him a thousand fears. I wish to omit all his\nother actions, since all have been alike and all succeeded\nwell. And the brevity of his life did not allow him to feel the\ncontrary, because if times had come when he had needed to\nproceed with caution, his ruin would have followed: he\nwould never have deviated from those modes to which\nnature inclined him.\n\nI conclude, thus, that when fortune varies and men\nremain obstinate in their modes, men are happy while they\nare in accord, and as they come into discord, unhappy. I\njudge this indeed, that it is better to be impetuous than\ncautious, because fortune is a woman; and it is necessary, if\none wants to hold her down, to beat her and strike her\ndown. And one sees that she lets herself be won more by the\nimpetuous than by those who proceed coldly. And so al-\nways, like a woman, she is the friend of the young, because\nthey are less cautious, more ferocious, and command her\nwith more audacity.\n\n\nXXVI\n\nExhortation to Seize Italy and to\nFree Her from the Barbarians\n\nThus, having considered everything discussed above, and\nthinking to myself whether in Italy at present the times have\nbeen tending to the honor of a new prince, and whether\n"
,"there is matter to give opportunity to someone prudent and\nvirtuous to introduce a form that would bring honor to him\nand good to the community of men there, it appears to me\nthat so many things are tending to the benefit of a new\nprince that I do not know what time has ever been more apt\nfor it. And if, as I said, it was necessary for anyone wanting\nto see the virtue of Moses that the people of Israel be en-\nslaved in Egypt, and to learn the greatness of spirit of Cy-\nrus, that the Persians be oppressed by the Medes, and to\nlearn the excellence of Theseus, that the Athenians be dis-\npersed, so at present to know the virtue of an Italian spirit it\nwas necessary that Italy be reduced to the condition in\nwhich she is at present, which is more enslaved than the\nHebrews, more servile than the Persians, more dispersed\nthan the Athenians, without a head, without order, beaten,\ndespoiled, torn, pillaged, and having endured ruin of every\nsort.\n\nAnd although up to now a glimmer has shone in some-\none who could judge that he had been ordered by God for\nher redemption, yet later it was seen that in the highest\ncourse of his actions, he was repulsed by fortune. So, left as\nif lifeless, she awaits whoever it can be that will heal her\nwounds, and put an end to the sacking of Lombardy, to the\ntaxes on the kingdom and on Tuscany, and cure her of her\nsores that have festered now for a long time. One may see\nhow she prays God to send her someone to redeem her from\nthese barbarous cruelties and insults. One may also see her\nready and disposed to follow a flag, provided that there be\nsomeone to pick it up. Nor may one see at present anyone in\nwhom she can hope more than in your illustrious house,\nwhich with its fortune and virtue, supported by God and by\nthe Church of which it is now prince, can put itself at the\n"
,"head of this redemption. This is not very difficult if you\nsummon up the actions and lives of those named above. And\nalthough these men are rare and marvelous, nonetheless\nthey were men, and each of them had less opportunity than\nthe present; for their undertaking was not more just than\nthis one, nor easier, nor was God more friendly to them\nthan to you. Here there is great justice: \u201cfor war is just to\nwhom it is necessary, and arms are pious when there is no\nhope but in arms.\u201d Here there is very great readiness, and\nwhere there is great readiness, there cannot be great diffi-\nculty, provided that your house keeps its aim on the orders\nof those whom I have put forth. Besides this, here may be\nseen extraordinary things without example, brought about\nby God: the sea has opened; a cloud has escorted you along\nthe way; the stone has poured forth water; here manna has\nrained; everything has concurred in your greatness. The\nremainder you must do yourself. God does not want to do\neverything, so as not to take free will from us and that part of\nthe glory that falls to us.\n\nAnd it is not a marvel if none of the Italians named\nbefore has been able to do what it is hoped will be done by\nyour illustrious house, and if in so many revolutions in Italy\nand in so many maneuvers of war, it always appears that\nmilitary virtue has died out in her. This arises from the fact\nthat her ancient orders were not good, and that there has not\nbeen anyone who has known how to find new ones; and\nnothing brings so much honor to a man rising newly as the\n"
,"new laws and the new orders found by him. When these\nthings have been founded well and have greatness in them,\nthey make him revered and admirable. And in Italy matter is\nnot lacking for introducing every form; here there is great\nvirtue in the limbs, if it were not lacking in the heads. Look\nhow in duels and in encounters with few the Italians are\nsuperior in force, dexterity, and ingenuity. But when it\ncomes to armies, they do not compare. And everything\nfollows from the weakness at the head, because those who\nknow are not obeyed, and each thinks he knows, since up to\nnow no one has been able to raise himself, both by virtue\nand by fortune, to a point where the others will yield to him.\nFrom this it follows that in so much time, in so many wars\nmade in the last twenty years, when there has been an army\nentirely Italian it has always proven to be bad. The first\ntestimony to this is Taro, then Alessandria, Capua, Genoa,\nVail\u00e0, Bologna, Mestre.\n\nThus, if your illustrious house wants to follow those\nexcellent men who redeemed their countries, it is necessary\nbefore all other things, as the true foundation of every un-\ndertaking, to provide itself with its own arms; for one can-\nnot have more faithful, nor truer, nor better soldiers. And\nalthough each of them may be good, all together become\nbetter when they see themselves commanded by their\nprince, and honored and indulged by him. It is necessary,\ntherefore, to prepare such arms for oneself so as to be able\nwith Italian virtue to defend oneself from foreigners. And\nalthough Swiss and Spanish infantry are esteemed to be\nterrifying, nonetheless there is a defect in both, by means of\nwhich a third order might not only oppose them but also be\nconfident of overcoming them. For the Spanish cannot\nwithstand horse, and the Swiss have to be afraid of infantry\nif they meet in combat any that are obstinate like them-\nselves. Hence it has been seen, and will be seen by experi-\n"
,"ence, that the Spanish cannot withstand French cavalry, and\nthe Swiss are ruined by Spanish infantry. And although a\ncomplete experiment of this last has not been seen, yet an\nindication of it was seen in the battle of Ravenna, when\nthe Spanish infantry confronted the German battalions,\nwho use the same order as the Swiss. There the Spanish,\nwith their agile bodies and aided by their bucklers, came\nbetween and under the Germans\u2019 pikes and attacked them\nsafely without their having any remedy for it; and if it had\nnot been for the cavalry that charged them, they would have\nworn out all the Germans. Having thus learned the defects\nof both of these infantry, one can order a new one that\nwould resist horse and not be afraid of infantry; this will be\ndone by a regeneration of arms and a change in orders. And\nthese are among those things which, when newly ordered,\ngive reputation and greatness to a new prince.\n\nThus, one should not let this opportunity pass, for Italy,\nafter so much time, to see her redeemer. I cannot express\nwith what love he would be received in all those provinces\nthat have suffered from these floods from outside; with what\nthirst for revenge, with what obstinate faith, with what pi-\nety, with what tears. What doors would be closed to him?\nWhat peoples would deny him obedience? What envy\nwould oppose him? What Italian would deny him homage?\nThis barbarian domination stinks to everyone. Then may\nyour illustrious house take up this task with the spirit and\nhope in which just enterprises are taken up, so that under\nits emblem this fatherland may be ennobled and under its\nauspices the saying of Petrarch\u2019s may come true:\n\nVirtue will take up arms against fury,\nand make the battle short,\nbecause the ancient valor in Italian hearts\nis not yet dead.\n"
,"Appendix\n\nIn the following letter, which has been called the most celebrated\nin all of Italian literature, Machiavelli describes one day in his life\nand remarks casually that he has just completed The Prince. The let-\nter was written in response to his friend Francesco Vettori, Flor-\nentine ambassador in Rome, who had previously sent a letter describ-\ning a day in his life. Machiavelli\u2019s reply is partly a parody of Vettori\u2019s\nsomewhat self-important recounting, but it also gives us a glimpse,\nfrom the outside, of the political philosopher at work. We learn,\namong other things, that The Prince arose from conversations with the\nancients, and that, in it, Machiavelli delved as deeply as he could into\nhis subject.\n\n\nNICCOL\u00d2 MACHIAVELLI TO FRANCESCO VETTORI,\nFLORENCE, DECEMBER 10, 1513.\n\nMagnificent ambassador:\n\n\u201cNever were divine favors late.\u201d I say this because I appear\nto have lost, no, mislaid your favor, since you have gone a\nlong time without writing me, and I was doubtful whence\nthe cause could arise. And of all those that came to my mind\nI took little account except for one, when I feared you had\nstopped writing to me because someone had written to you\nthat I was not a good warden of your letters; and I knew\nthat, apart from Filippo and Pagolo, no one else had seen\nthem on account of me. I regained your favor by your last\nletter of the 23rd of last month, where I was very pleased to\nsee how orderedly and quietly you exercise this public of-\nfice; and I urge you to continue so, for whoever lets go of his\nown convenience for the convenience of others, only loses\nhis own and gets no thanks from them. And because For-\ntune wants to do everything, she wants us to allow her to do\nit, to remain quiet and not give trouble, and to await the\n"
,"time at which she allows men something to do; and then it\nwill be right for you to give more effort, to watch things\nmore, and for me to leave my villa and say: \u201cHere I am.\u201d\nTherefore, wishing to return equal favors, I cannot tell you\nin this letter of mine anything other than what my life is like,\nand if you judge that it should be bartered for yours, I will be\ncontent to exchange it.\n\nI stay in my villa, and since these last chance events\noccurred, I have not spent, to add them all up, twenty days\nin Florence. Until now I have been catching thrushes with\nmy own hands. I would get up before day, prepare traps,\nand go out with a bundle of cages on my back, so that I\nlooked like Geta when he returned from the harbor with\nAmphitryon\u2019s books; I caught at least two, at most six\nthrushes. And so passed all September; then this pastime,\nthough annoying and strange, gave out, to my displeasure.\nAnd what my life is like, I will tell you. I get up in the\nmorning with the sun and go to a wood of mine that I am\nhaving cut down, where I stay for two hours to look over\nthe work of the past day, and to pass time with the wood-\ncutters, who always have some disaster on their hands\neither among themselves or with their neighbors. And\nregarding this wood I would have a thousand beautiful\nthings to tell you of what happened to me with Frosino da\nPanzano and others who want wood from it. And Frosino\nin particular sent for a number of loads without telling me\nanything, and on payment wanted to hold back ten lire\nfrom me, which he said he should have had from me four\nyears ago when he beat me at cricca at Antonio Guicciar-\ndini\u2019s. I began to raise the devil and was on the point of ac-\ncusing the driver who had gone for it of theft; but Giovanni\nMachiavelli came between us and brought us to agree.\nBatista Guicciardini, Filippo Ginori, Tommaso del Bene,\n"
,"and some other citizens, when that north wind was blowing,\nordered a load each from me. I promised to all, and sent one\nto Tommaso which in Florence turned into a half-load,\nbecause to stack it up there were himself, his wife, his\nservant, and his children, so that they looked like Gabbura\nwith his boys when he bludgeons an ox on Thursday. So,\nwhen I saw whose profit it was, I told the others I had no\nmore wood; and all have made a big point of it, especially\nBatista, who counts this among the other disasters of Prato.\n\nWhen I leave the wood, I go to a spring, and from\nthere to an aviary of mine. I have a book under my arm,\nDante or Petrarch, or one of the minor poets like Tibullus,\nOvid, and such. I read of their amorous passions and their\nloves; I remember my own and enjoy myself for a while in\nthis thinking. Then I move on along the road to the inn; I\nspeak with those passing by; I ask them news of their places;\nI learn various things; and I note the various tastes and\ndifferent fancies of men. In the meantime comes the hour to\ndine, when I eat with my company what food this poor villa\nand tiny patrimony allow. Having eaten, I return to the inn;\nthere is the host, ordinarily a butcher, a miller, two bakers.\nWith them I become a rascal for the whole day, playing at\ncricca and tric-trac, from which arise a thousand quarrels and\ncountless abuses with insulting words, and most times we\nare fighting over a penny and yet we can be heard shouting\nfrom San Casciano. Thus involved with these vermin I\nscrape the mold off my brain and I satisfy the malignity of\nthis fate of mine, as I am content to be trampled on this path\nso as to see if she will be ashamed of it.\n\nWhen evening has come, I return to my house and go\ninto my study. At the door I take off my clothes of the day,\ncovered with mud and mire, and I put on my regal and\ncourtly garments; and decently reclothed, I enter the an-\ncient courts of ancient men, where, received by them\nlovingly, I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was\nborn for. There I am not ashamed to speak with them and to\n"
,"ask them the reason for their actions; and they in their\nhumanity reply to me. And for the space of four hours I feel\nno boredom, I forget every pain, I do not fear poverty, death\ndoes not frighten me. I deliver myself entirely to them.\nAnd because Dante says that to have understood with-\nout retaining does not make knowledge, I have noted\nwhat capital I have made from their conversation and have\ncomposed a little work De Principatibus [On Principalities],\nwhere I delve as deeply as I can into reflections on this\nsubject, debating what a principality is, of what kinds they\nare, how they are acquired, how they are maintained, why\nthey are lost. And if you have ever been pleased by any of my\nwhimsies, this one should not displease you; and to a prince,\nand especially to a new prince, it should be welcome. So I\nam addressing it to his Magnificence, Giuliano. Filippo\nCasavecchia has seen it; he can give you an account in part\nboth of the thing in itself and of the discussions I had with\nhim, although I am all the time fattening and polishing it.\n\nYou wish, magnificent ambassador, that I leave this\nlife and come to enjoy your life with you. I will do it in any\ncase, but what tempts me now is certain dealings of mine\nwhich I will have done in six weeks. What makes me be\ndoubtful is that the Soderini are there, whom I would be\nforced, if I came, to visit and speak with. I should fear that at\nmy return I would not expect to get off at my house, but I\nwould get off at the Bargello, for although this state has\nvery great foundations and great security, yet it is new, and\nbecause of this suspicious; nor does it lack wiseacres who, to\n"
,"appear like Pagolo Bertini, would let others run up a bill and\nleave me to think of paying. I beg you to relieve me of\nthis fear, and then I will come in the time stated to meet\nyou anyway.\n\nI have discussed with Filippo this little work of mine,\nwhether to give it to him or not; and if it is good to give it,\nwhether it would be good for me to take it or send it to you.\nNot giving it would make me fear that at the least it would\nnot be read by Giuliano and that this Ardinghelli would take\nfor himself the honor of this latest effort of mine. The ne-\ncessity that chases me makes me give it, because I am be-\ncoming worn out, and I cannot remain as I am for a long\ntime without becoming despised because of poverty, besides\nthe desire I have that these Medici lords begin to make use\nof me even if they should begin by making me roll a stone.\nFor if I should not then win them over to me, I should\ncomplain of myself; and through this thing, if it were read,\none would see that I have neither slept through nor played\naway the fifteen years I have been at the study of the art of\nthe state. And anyone should be glad to have the service of\none who is full of experience at the expense of another.\nAnd one should not doubt my faith, because having always\nobserved faith, I ought not now be learning to break it.\nWhoever has been faithful and good for forty-three years, as\nI have, ought not to be able to change his nature, and of my\nfaith and goodness my poverty is witness.\n\nI should like, then, for you to write me again on how\nthis matter appears to you, and I commend myself to you.\n\nBe prosperous.\n10 December 1513\nNiccol\u00f2 Machiavelli, in Florence.\n"],"chunk":"\n146 "
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